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Abstract
Within the past thirty years, the U.S. government has spent over three trillion dol-
lars supporting research and development projects across its various federal agencies.
There is a considerable, long-standing need to monitor, justify, and improve this allo-
cation of taxpayer monies. However, oversight and prioritization of research funding
has been haphazard, largely because the agencies that administer research funding
lack appropriate metrics to measure project success.
We investigate the use of Bayesian belief networks as a means of tracking the
success of research and development projects and prioritizing research funding across
different experimental efforts. The focus of the thesis is on demonstrating a proof
of concept of Bayesian networks by applying the methodology to an alloy research
project led by Dr. Ronald Ballinger at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
We determine the main parameters of interest in the project, establish a network
of conditional probability to relate experimental results to alloy viability, perform a
Bayesian updating of the research success probability using experimental results, and
examine how the optimal choice of experimental design changes as new information
is obtained.
We find that belief networks are an appropriate tool for tracking and improving
upon the efficiency of research and development. Some potential hurdles are dis-
cussed: researcher overconfidence, computational limits of Monte Carlo assessment,
and principal-agent games. We reach the conclusion that belief networks are appli-
cable to research and development projects and that their use should be endorsed by
the Office of Management and Budget as a means of improving accountability among
research-intensive federal agencies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bayes' Theorem is a simple, straightforward statement of conditional probability. In
basic terms, it is a formula that describes a state of knowledge and how that state
of knowledge changes when introduced to new evidence. Research and development
(R&D) is, at its core, a Bayesian process- faced with uncertainty, scientists gather
evidence from experiments and investigations in order to improve their understanding
of a system. It is in this manner that a state of knowledge is improved upon; every
experiment conducted is, at its most fundamental level, an empirical measurement
of some underlying reality, and each measurement of this reality brings a state of
knowledge closer to the truth.
If we accept that the purpose of scientific research is to produce knowledge that
has utility to mankind, then we are able to show preference between one state of
knowledge and another based upon the utility that those states provide. It is then
also possible to use Bayes' Theorem to determine the benefit of a given scientific
effort. By forming a probabilistic expectation of the effects that an experiment will
have on our state of knowledge, it is possible to quantify the benefits of research.
For decades, the U.S. Federal Government has sponsored and directed R&D
projects in an effort to capture the benefits of improved knowledge. Federal research
is used to inform regulation, improve military capabilities, and develop products of
public importance. While the government does not always explicitly quantify the
benefits of these public programs, it clearly demonstrates a capacity to prioritize
objectives and make trade-offs with scarce resources.
What is lacking in the federal decision making framework is a translation of pri-
orities into efficient funding allocations. It is not enough to assign a value to a new
fighter jet, safety regulation, or other research result- until the probability of achiev-
ing that result is estimated, no true cost-benefit analysis can be performed. Often,
the consequence of this disconnect has been the mismanagement of government re-
search: many low-return projects continue to obtain funding long after unfavorable
results have been received, leaving more promising endeavors unfunded.
Past efforts by government to improve research and development efficiency have
struggled, primarily because the inherent nature of scientific discovery does not lend
itself easily to the standard set of measurement techniques used elsewhere. Despite the
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) insistence the efficiency of research should
be measured using "outcome-based" metrics, federal agencies have come to rely upon
an inadequate set of metrics to define their programmatic efficiency. "Administrative
costs as a percentage of total program costs" or "average time to process research
grant proposals" are statistics that surely capture some aspect of efficiency, but clearly
do not fulfill the desire for outcome-based metrics as intended by the OMB. What we
are primarily interested in is not the speed with which a grant reviewer completes his
job, but moreso the accuracy with which he completes it- in other words, whether
he is identifying the most promising lines of research based upon the priorities that
the agency has set.
This thesis examines the possibility of applying Bayesian belief networks- net-
works of nodes that depict a current state of knowledge and beliefs- to the problem
of measuring and improving research and development efficiency. Special attention is
given to publicly-led R&D efforts and the difficulty agencies have had in evaluating
non-repeated or unique research, multi-year projects, "basic" research, and applied
research that has lagging or difficult to measure public benefits. To demonstrate the
viability of the Bayesian approach, this thesis works through a prototypical case exam-
ple using an ongoing publicly-funded research project at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. The results from this prototypical example are used to create usable
metrics, identify possible hurdles to the Bayesian approach and develop solutions to
identified hurdles.
The remainder of this introduction details the scope and nature of public research
in the United States and makes definitions that will be useful for later analysis.
Chapter two describes the current practices in government research oversight
among major U.S. agencies, and details the limitations of these practices.
Chapter three describes Bayes' Theorem and its theoretical application to research
and development oversight.
Chapter four describes the research project that was selected as a prototypical case
study and gives a brief overview of the scientific concepts necessary to understand
the project.
Chapter five describes the analysis of the case study, detailing each step of the pro-
cess, including defining the success space, determining variables of interest, gathering
prior distributions, and conducting the updating of priors using obtained evidence.
Chapter six describes the results of the case study analysis.
Chapter seven discusses the results of the case study, their implication for the use
of Bayesian networks as a way of measuring research efficiency, and summarizes the
major conclusions of the thesis.
1.1 The Scale of Research and Development in the
United States
From 1976 to 2009, the U.S. Federal Government appropriated $3.46 trillion (2008
dollars) to research and development efforts[11]. These funds amount to more than
1% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) during that time period[12], each year ac-
counts for a quarter to a half of all national spending on R&D[8], and internationally,
constitutes 10% of all world R&D expenditures[6, 17]. Government-led R&D pro-
grams are tasked with making advances in defense, health, space, energy, and other
fields of national importance.
In fiscal year 2009, the budget authority for research and development funding,
including stimulus spending, was set by Congress at $172 billion. Five agencies ac-
counted for nearly 95% of this funding: the Department of Defense (DoD)- 48.1%,
the Department of Health and Human Services (primarily through the National In-
stitutes of Health, NIH)- 24.4%, the Department of Energy (DoE)- 9.5%, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)- 8.0%, and the National
Science Foundation (NSF)- 4.3%[11].
1.2 The Nature of Public R&D
Publicly funded research and development takes a variety of forms and is directed
by a broad range of bodies with diverse and often overlapping programmatic goals.
Because Bayesian decision analysis depends on an accurate depiction of current and
possible states of knowledge, its application to research and development will vary.
In the context of applying Bayesian decision analysis to research and development
projects, we conceive of three important features of research that will determine the
potential of belief networks to improve outcomes.
1.2.1 Basic vs. Applied Research
One of the most common distinctions made between research programs is that of
basic and applied. The OMB defines applied research as "systematic study to gain
knowledge or understanding necessary to determine the means by which a recognized
and specific need may be met[23]" (emphasis added). In other words, applied re-
search is motivated by identifiable needs and is targeted towards the creation of new
knowledge that directly improves an agency's capacity to meet those needs. Similar
to applied research are development projects, which are more conservative in their
generation of new knowledge but are directed towards highly specified ends, such as
the creation of a new product or process.
By contrast, the OMB defines basic research as "systematic study directed to-
ward fuller knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena
and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or products in
mind[23]" (emphasis added). Unlike applied research, basic research is not motivated
by unsatisfied needs, but instead by discrepancies or gaps in existing, fundamental
knowledge. It is not needs-based, but instead exploratory- as such, it is unclear a
priori, whether the new knowledge generated by basic research will fruitfully inform
subsequent experiments or provide solutions to immediate needs.
There is also a significant gray area between the realms of basic and applied
research. Some research may be theoretical, yet still clearly be motivated by known,
specific needs. For example, research into plasma physics and superconductors is
primarily motivated by the desire to develop fusion power and improve the efficiency
of electrical conductors.
In terms of applying Bayesian decision making to R&D, the most important dis-
tinction between basic and applied research is the degree to which the value of different
potential research outcomes can be known prior to receiving the results. One example
of research that meets almost every pre-requisite for successful Bayesian decision mak-
ing EXCEPT for the ability to assign value to research outcomes is the Large Hadron
Collider (LHC), a 27km long particle accelerator designed to run experiments that
will improve our understanding of particle physics. While the LHC provides quantifi-
able data (through a massive array of detectors and sensors), will explore questions
whose answer sets can be fully characterized (the Higgs Boson either exists or does
not), and can report prior beliefs on the answer set (scientists at a rival collider, the
Tevatron, recently projected the chances of their facility gathering enough evidence to
confirm the existence of the Higgs Boson as a function of the particle's mass and the
length of facility operating period, see Figure D in the appendices), it is effectively
impossible to estimate the societal value of one research result versus another, and
thus there is no rigorous way to form an expectation of the benefits of the project
and compare it to other potential research efforts.
The funding allocation between basic research, applied research, and development
varies from one government body to another. In the DoD for example, more than
92% of all R&D funds are spent on development efforts, while only 2% goes towards
basic research[9]. By contrast, outside of the DoD, most R&D funding is split evenly
between basic and applied research, with only a small fraction going towards devel-
opment projects. In total, recent history has seen 60% of public R&D funding gone
towards development, with the remaining 40% split evenly between basic and applied
research[10].
Importantly for Bayesian applications, most public R&D projects are organized
around clear missions with well-defined programmatic needs. The NIH, which sup-
ports over half of all public basic research, targets its funding toward specific needs:
cancer, allergies, infectious disease, cardiopulmonary health, and other medical areas
in which improvements can lead to easily estimable benefits in terms of lives saved.
As such, Bayesian decision analysis can be applied to the large majority of federal
R&D.
1.2.2 "Hard" vs. "Soft" Science
Another important distinction is between so-called hard and soft science. The term
"hard science" is used to describe research that provides objective, quantifiable data
through experiment. "Soft science," by contrast, yields qualitative data that requires
subjective interpretation. Soft science does not lend itself easily to a Bayesian treat-
ment because unlike quantified data, which must take some value on a number line,
qualitative data may take unpredictable forms. If the possible results of an experiment
cannot be characterized prior to the experiment, then not all nodes in the Bayesian
network can be depicted accurately. Qualitative data can always be organized into
categories that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive through the use of
a lexicographic set (such as "high," "medium," "low") that (as a last resort) includes
"Other" as an answer. However, to the extent that lexicographic sets lump together
dissimilar data, Bayesian networks are unlikely to be useful- by and large, belief
networks do not adapt well to qualitative or subjective inputs.
Furthermore, hard science has another advantage over soft science: as part of
sound experimental design, researchers in hard science are likely to have already
given thought to the implications of different potential research results. In medical
trials for example, considerable forethought is given to the sample population sizes
to be tested in order to yield statistically significant results.
1.2.3 Intramural vs. Extramural Research
Finally, there are considerable differences in funding mechanisms across agencies.
For the NIH, typically 90% of the research budget is spent on extramural research,
that is, research conducted by outside institutions through grants and contracts, and
consistently more than half of the budget is spent on research grant awards[7]. Other
agencies rely more on intramural research to satisfy their mission goals, delegating
research tasks to in-house laboratories and facilities. There is also significant variation
between agencies in how much of their extramural research budget goes towards
projects that were solicited by the agency and how much goes towards research topics
that were unsolicited by the agency but instead were suggested by outside individuals
and institutions.
Extramural research presents an interesting challenge to the application of belief
networks. The decision-making strength of a belief network relies strongly on the
honesty with which initial beliefs and conditional probability relationships are put into
the network. If an experimenter lies about the expected accuracy of an experiment
or submits overly optimistic beliefs on the probability of obtaining favorable results,
the value of his experiment will be exaggerated.
This creates what is commonly referred to as an "agency problem[16]." If the
interests of the principal (the government / funding body) do not align with those
of its agent (the researcher who conducts work on the principal's behalf), there is
a motivation for the agent to "game" the system in a way that runs counter to the
principal's interest. To the extent that extramural input is used to inform decision-
making, funding bodies will need to set up an incentive structure that rewards honesty
and punishes misrepresentation.
1.3 Chapter Summary
Public research and development is a major enterprise within the United States, with
many federal agencies spending billions and tens of billions of dollars annually on re-
search and development[11]. Scientific inquiry is crucial to achieving missions of great
public importance, and federal agencies have struggled to ensure that research monies
are spent in the most effective way possible. Bayesian decision analysis holds promise
in improving the results of research and better allocating the public's investment in
new knowledge and products. There are some limitations to the Bayesian method,
and as such, the method shows the greatest promise when research motives are clearly
defined, the range of potential results can be characterized prior to conducting the
research, and the decision-making inputs are solicited from honest, informed experts.
This thesis examines an ongoing publicly funded research project and uses it as a
prototypical case study to demonstrate the use of Bayesian methods.
Chapter 2
Past and Current Efforts to
Improve R&D Efficiency
2.1 Defining Efficiency
It is worthwhile to ask what exactly we mean when we say that we would like to
improve the "efficiency" of research and development.
Conceptually, there are two different kinds of efficiency: productive efficiency and
allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency, or "process efficiency" is concerned with
how much research can be performed for a given set of resources. If two researchers
can perform the same experiment to the same standard, but one can perform it with
fewer resources than the other, we would say that the researcher who can complete
the task with fewer resources is more efficient. Allocative efficiency, or "portfolio
efficiency" is concerned with how well funding is allocated across different research
options. It is primarily concerned with how well research funding is invested, whether
it is directed to projects that offer the greatest societal return per unit of resources
invested.
Efficiency is most meaningfully defined as the ratio of benefits to costs[18]. What
makes this definition difficult to apply in the context of R&D is that the ultimate
outcomes of research are both probabilistic and difficult to objectively measure. The
purpose of tracking efficiency is to improve it- even if the ultimate outcomes of
research could be objectively and promptly measured, the element of chance would
obscure the relationship between measured "efficiency" and true allocative and pro-
ductive efficiency. Changing the definition of efficiency to the expected ratio of benefits
to costs solves the problem but it raises a new concern: "How do agencies form their
expectations of results?" Under such a system, an agency would be asked to form two
expectations: an expecation on the probability of a project's success (overcoming the
problem of probabilistic results), and an expectation on the ultimate value of that
success (overcoming the problem of unmeasurable ultimate outcomes).
Thus, what is needed is not just a new metric for efficiency, but also (as this
new metric will be one level removed from the meaningful definition of efficiency) a
method of confirming the accuracy and relevance of this new metric. It is of added
benefit if the process of measurement highlights areas for improvement or suggests a
course of action.
2.2 The Government Performance and Results Act
For decades, the U.S. Federal Government has recognized the importance of perfor-
mance evaluation as a means of ensuring the judicious use of taxpayer monies. Early
efforts were focused on simple forms of accountability, such as identifying project
goals and improving transparency in budgeting[19].
As time went on, these efforts became more comprehensive and attempted to more
closely track the relationship between program resources and outcomes. The current
system of oversight has its roots in the 1990's when, in response to perceived waste and
inefficiency in publicly-funded programs, Congress and the executive branch initiated
a reform of the statutory requirements and management practices of federal agencies.
The linchpin of this reform effort came in 1993, when Congress passed the Government
Performance and Results Act (GRPA). This act requires that all government agencies
develop strategic plans for program activities, establish performance goals, and submit
to Congress an annual report on the progress made by each program activity in
achieving its set goals[3].
2.3 The Program Assessment Rating Tool
In 2002, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed the Program As-
sessment Rating Tool (PART), a diagnostic tool designed to improve compliance with
GRPA requirements. In its first year, the OMB used PART to assess 234 programs
covering roughly 20% of the federal budget, and each year following, the OMB ex-
panded evaluations to an additional 20% of budget coverage. As part of compliance
with PART, each program explicitly identifies performance metrics and uses them to
justify public funding[19].
PART is a questionnaire intended to ensure consistency of performance evaluation
across programs and assist agencies in identifying ways to improve program perfor-
mance. It is made up of 25 questions divided into four sections, with each section
weighted to form an overall score (a summary of PART sections is given in Table 2.1).
Each question is, by default, given equal weighting within its section, although the
weighting can be altered on a case by case basis. Additionally, research and develop-
ment programs are given three extra questions, two in the Strategic Planning Section
and one in the Program Management section.
Table 2.1: PART Question Sections
Section Weight Questions Answer Types
Program Purpose and Design 20% 5 Yes/No
Strategic Planning 10% 8 Yes/No
Program Management 20% 7 Yes/No
Program Results/Accountability 50% 5 Yes/Large Extent/Small Extent/No
The full list of questions can be found in Appendix A. If the OMB judges that a
program has not developed acceptable performance metrics or does not have sufficient
data upon which to make a judgement, it is given a "Results Not Demonstrated"
rating. Otherwise, the OMB converts the numeric score that results from the PART
questionaire into a semantic rating of "effective," "moderately effective," "adequate,"
or "ineffective."
Table 2.2: PART Question Scoring
Rating Score Range
Effective 85-100
Moderately Effective 70-84
Adequate 50-69
Ineffective 0-49
For a public program, there are high stakes attached to the results of the PART
questionaire. Programs that receive a rating of "Ineffective" are often targeted for
cuts by Congress. Over time, there has been a general improvement in PART rating
assessments- it is unclear whether this effect is due to actual improvement among
programs, bureaucratic adaptation to OMB oversight, or is a statistical artifact of
the different program populations that each year samples (the 2002 assessment only
looks at 20% of applicable programs whereas later years look at nearly all federal
programs) [211.
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Figure 2-1: PART Assessment Ratings, 2002-2007
The GRPA applies to all public programs, but research programs in particular
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have found it challenging to comply with GRPA/PART requirements to measure
efficiency. Unlike other public efforts, where there are clear benchmarks and metrics
available with which to fulfill the PART requirements, research is a difficult field to
measure for three reasons:
1. Research consists largely of unique, one-off efforts that defy easy standardization
or comparison.
2. Research outcomes are probabilistic, not deterministic.
3. The benefits of research are often delayed or dependent on follow-up actions.
In 2007, to help federal agencies complete PART assessments for research projects,
the OMB released Research and Development Program Investment Criteria[20]. In
their guidance, the OMB emphasized three criteria: Relevance, Quality, and Per-
formance, reflecting the relevance of research investments to national priorities, a
defensible method of quality assessment, and performance assurance through the de-
velopment of clear objectives, metrics, and identifiable results. The full guidance
memorandum is included in Appendix C
Research-intensive agencies have expressed frustration with PART requirements,
particularly question 3.4, "Does the program have procedures to measure and achieve
efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?" There is a widely held
perception that the OMB does not apply the metric requirement evenly across all
projects, that there is considerable variation between OMB reviewers as to what
types of metrics get accepted or rejected. Indeed, nearly identical metrics have been
accepted for some research projects and rejected for others, without clear reason as
to what differentiates the two[24].
2.4 Current Efficiency Metrics
The OMB has strongly emphasized that efficiency metrics used by agencies in fulfill-
ment of their PART requirement should be "outcome-based." As an example of what
is meant by "outcome," the OMB gives the example of a reduction of HIV infections-
reducing the transmission of a disease is a clear, quantifiable public benefit[20]. What
the OMB intends by emphasizing outcome-based metrics is to create a linkage be-
tween resources invested in R&D and societal benefits returned.
Unfortunately, it is impractical to measure the ultimate outcomes of research
projects using any objective system of accountancy[3]. The outcomes generated by
research and development are not easily attributable to individual projects or ef-
forts for a variety of reasons: the effects of research are difficult to isolate from the
effects of other factors, research does not directly create a usable good for society,
the realization of research outcomes often lags the research itself, research outcomes
are probabilistic and metrics based upon them will not distinguish between "lucky"
results and those created by well-designed projects, and often, the mechanism by
which research improves societal welfare (especially in the case of basic research) is
the enabling of subsequent research efforts.
Unable to develop "outcome"-based metrics, federal research programs have set-
tled for a series of substitutes which could, at best, be characterized as "output"-based
metrics. "Outputs," as defined by the OMB, are the internal, intermediate results of
a program. They are products that are not of direct benefit to the public, but are
correlated in some way with ultimate benefits. Rather than attempt to track the final
benefits of research, current metrics instead track the intermediate results of research.
As a proxy measure for ultimate outcomes, these metrics are poor: the relationship
between the outputs tracked by an agency and outcomes is weak, and in most cases
the use of such metrics may be counter-productive[3). A common saying in produc-
tivity tracking is "You get what you measure." The consequence of attaching high
stakes to outputs that are only tangentially related to ultimate success is that those
outputs will be increased even when it is detrimental to the agency's mission[13].
The metrics most commonly used by the largest five research agencies include[21]:
" Average cost per standard measurement or analysis.
* Time, in days, between receipt of grant proposal and award.
o Administrative costs as a percentage of total costs.
* Peer-reviewed publications per full-time employee (or per dollar).
" Percentage of projects that are peer or merit-reviewed.
" Variance from schedule and cost.
The most meaningful definition of efficiency is the ratio of benefits to costs. None
of the above metrics provide a reliable measurement of benefits and costs except in
rare cases. Three of the metrics only address one half of the cost-benefit ratio (admin-
istrative costs as a percentage of total costs, percentage of projects that are peer or
merit-reviewed, and variance from schedule and cost). The remaining three metrics
make unreliable assumptions about how output or cost correlates with the chosen
tracked data. Cost per measurement is a sufficient metric if and only if each mea-
surement is conducted with similar quality standards and provides roughly constant
expectation of benefits to society- most research efforts are sufficiently unique to
defy such easy collective treatment[3]. Time in days between receipt and award of a
grant proposal assumes both that time is a good proxy for total cost (it is unclear why
this should be the case), and that the award of a grant proposal returns some constant
benefit (highly dubious). The last of the three, peer-reviewed publications per dollar,
may be an appropriate metric if the primary activity of the program is the production
of publications and peer review is sufficient to guarantee a particular level of social
benefit per publication. However, one simple reason to suspect that not all publi-
cations have the same social value is that publication rates vary by discipline[13]-
an interdisciplinary agency that tracked efficiency with this metric might find itself
becoming more "efficient" simply by shifting emphasis between disciplines.
The shortfalls of these efficiency metrics give strong reason to believe that among
research projects, programmatic goals are being poorly served (if not actively harmed)
by existing regulatory requirements. Until new metrics can be provided, there is little
reason to believe that either PART or the GRPA are improving research outcomes.
2.5 Chapter Summary
Outcome-based metrics have been long sought-after by research intensive federal agen-
cies, as well as the Office of Management and Budget, as a means of justifying and
improving the efficiency of public research funding. Current metrics and other quan-
titative tools of oversight are insufficient: they do not capture the most important
measure of research efficiency, the ratio of a project's benefits to costs, and may, if
relied upon too strongly, have contrary effects on agency performance. Bayesian be-
lief networks may offer a method of developing meaningful, outcome-based metrics of
efficiency, leading to improved research decision-making and a stronger capability by
agencies to carry out their mission.
Chapter 3
Bayes' Theorem and Its
Application to Research Projects
3.1 Bayes' Theorem
Bayes theorem is a simple, yet powerful statement of conditional probability
Pr(AJB) - Pr(BIA) Pr(A) (3.1)
Pr(B)
where A and B represent hypotheses, evidence, latent variables, or unknown pa-
rameters. Pr(A) is called the prior probability, or, more simply, the prior. It repre-
sents a current belief, prior to new evidence, concerning the probability of a hypothe-
sis, A, being true. The prior can be informed by past evidence and measurements, or
it could be the purely subjective assessment of an expert. Pr(A|B) is called the pos-
terior probability, or, more simply, the posterior. It represents a new belief, updated
by evidence, concerning the probability of a hypothesis, A. Pr(BIA) is the probability
of observing B if A were true, divided by the probability of observing B.
Most commonly, Bayes' Theorem is used to describe a hypothesis, A, and evi-
dence that relates to that hypothesis, B. For example, A might be the event that it
has rained earlier today, and B might be the observation that nearby grass is wet.
'A quick derivation of Bayes' Theorem is included in Appendix B
More interestingly, A might be the event/hypothesis that a parameter is equal to a
given value, and B is an experimental measurement of that parameter. In that case,
Bayes' Theorem can be used to derive Equation 3.2, which describes how a continuous
probabilistic distribution would change in response to evidence
_ fy(ylX = x) fx(x) (3.2)fx(xlY =y)- f().2fy (y)
where the terms parallel those of the discrete form of Bayes' Theorem, with
fy(yIX = x) called a likelihood function.
This process of using evidence to change a belief in a hypothesis is referred to
as Bayesian inference or updating. One unique property of the process is that it is
path-independent; if two relevant observations are made, B and C, it does not matter
in which order they are used to update A, the posterior will be the same regardless.
Bayesian updating can also be used to define a new class of probability distribution
functions whose prior and posterior are of the same family of functions when updated
by a given likelihood function. When this happens, the prior is said to be "conju-
gate" to the likelihood function, and the prior function itself is called a "conjugate
prior." When updating a conjugate prior, Bayes' Theorem is mathematically simple
to apply- the parameters that define the prior distribution (called hyperparameters
to distinguish them from the underlying parameter that the prior distribution tracks),
are modified by the evidence in a simple, formulaic fashion.
It is also possible to link together several random variables to form a Bayesian
network or "belief network." This network will usually have a small set of parent
nodes, which represent the evidential results of experiments, and a larger set of child
nodes, which represent the parameters or hypotheses of interest in an experiment.
Relationships of conditional probabilities link the nodes together. The central idea of
this thesis is to make experimental "success" (defined either as a simple hypothesis or
a variable whose value is dependent on the parameters represented by other nodes)
one of the defined nodes in a Bayesian network, so that predictions can be made
on the likelihood or degree of success, and these predictions can be updated by new
evidence.
3.1.1 An Example of Bayes' Theorem
Paul is given a coin which he knows to be biased such that a coin flip returns the biased
side with 4 probability. While Paul knows the coin is biased, he does not know which
side the coin is biased towards. Not having seen evidence suggesting either heads or
tails, nor having any subjective reason to believe one bias more likely than the other,
Paul begins with as naive a prior as possible: he assigns equal probability to each
possibility.
Seeking to discover whether the coin is heads-biased or tails-biased, Paul flips the
coin and obtains a tails result. Using Bayes' Theorem, he would like to know the
probability that the coin is heads-biased.
If we define A as the hypothesis that the coin is heads biased, and B as the
observation of a tails result from a coin flip, then the prior, Pr(A), is equal to 1.
Pr(B), is equal to the probability that the coin is heads-biased multiplied by the
probability of receiving a tails with a heads-biased coin, plus the probability that the
coin is tails biased multiplied by the probability of receiving a tails with a tails-biased
coin; I * - + j * j = -. And finally, Pr(BIA) is the probability of obtaining a tails
with a heads-biased coin, 1. The probability that the coin is heads biased, given a
tails flip, Pr(AIB), is equal to -
Paul then decides to flip the coin again and receives another tails result. This time,
instead of using a naive prior, he uses the latest posterior as his prior: Pr(A) = 4.
Pr(B), again, is equal to the probability that the coin is heads-biased multiplied by
the probability of receiving a tails with a heads-biased coin, plus the probability that
the coin is tails biased multiplied by the probability of receiving a tails with a tails-
biased coin;*4+ * = And finally, Pr(B|A) is the probability of obtaining
a tails with a heads-biased coin, . After the second tails result, the new posterior,
Pr(AIB), is equal to -
3.2 Bayes' Theorem's Relation to Research
The relevance of Bayesian updating to research and development is clear if the above
example is refrained. Suppose that Paul is not flipping coins, but instead studying
alloys for use in a new product. He is looking for an alloy that meets an array of
measureable material requirements, such as tensile strength, resistance to corrosion,
thermal conductivity, and so on. Paul has a candidate alloy that he believes has a
50% chance of meeting the property requirements. He also has a scientific test that
he can run to determine whether the alloy meets these requirements. If the alloy truly
is viable, the test will return a positive result 75% of the time, but if it's an inviable
alloy, the test will return a positive result with only 25% probability.
The mathematics of the alloy example are identical to those of the previous coin
flip example, but instead of the posterior tracking the probability that a coin is heads
biased, it tracks the probability that a given alloy meets a set of physical requirements.
The most important use of this approach is to track the top-level probability of
success in an R&D program- in other words, let Pr(A) be the probability of success
and let B be the results of project experiments. This will enable research funding
agencies to make midcourse corrections and actively manage their portfolio of research
investments. For example, suppose that Paul has two candidate alloys that he can
perform tests on. His prior beliefs are that each alloy has a 50% chance of being
viable. Paul's cost of testing an alloy is $1 for the first test, $0.60 for the second
test, $0.36 for the third test, and so on, such that the cost of each test is a geometric
series, with the cost of determining the viability of the alloy with absolute certainty
(the cost of conducting infinite tests) equal to $2.50.
Suppose, as a simplifying assumption, that Paul assigns value to only one state
of knowledge: knowing that an alloy is viable with absolute certainty. He assigns no
inherent value to any other state of knowledge, including knowing that an alloy is
inviable with absolute certainty, or knowing the viability of an alloy without absolute
certainty- these states of knowledge are valued only insofar as they help Paul reach
the state of knowledge that an alloy is viable with absolute certainty.
Paul, having no initial reason to believe one alloy is more likely to be viable than
the other, runs a test on the first alloy (the two alloys will be called Alloy I and Alloy
II for convenience) and receives a negative result. He is now given the choice between
continuing his testing of Alloy I to completion at a cost of $1.50, or switching to Alloy
II and testing it to completion at a cost of $2.50.
After the first test, there is only a 25% chance of Alloy I being a viable alloy, and
a 50% chance of Alloy II being viable. Because the cost of fully testing Alloy I is
$1.50 and the cost of fully testing Alloy II is $2.50, Alloy II offers the greater chance
of success per dollar. Given only these two choices, Paul decides to switch to Alloy
II.
Now suppose that Paul has a less restricting set of choices; his choices are switching
to Alloy II and continuing testing of it to completion, or conducting one more test on
Alloy I before having to decide whether to continue testing Alloy I to completion or
switching to Alloy II. Should he end the testing of Alloy I immediately, or conduct
one more test?
If Paul conducts one more test on Alloy I, there is a j chance that the result will
be positive (there is a 1 chance that the alloy is viable, and a chance that it is4 4
inviable, with a I and 1 chance of getting a positive in each scenario respectively).4 4
If the result is positive, the updated probability on Alloy I's viability will be 50%,
and Paul's choices will be between continuing testing on Alloy I with a probability of
finding a viable alloy of 50% and cost of $0.90, or beginning work on Alloy II with a
success probability of 50% and a cost of $2.50. If the result is negative, Paul's choices
will be between continuing work on Alloy I with a success probability of 10% and a
cost of $0.90, or switching to Alloy II with a success probability of 50% and a cost of
$2.50.
Thus, if Paul chooses to run one more test on Alloy I, he will have a chance
(the probability of a positive result) of paying $1.50 total (the cost of testing Alloy I
to completion), and a chance of paying $3.10 total (the cost of testing Alloy II to
completion plus the cost of having run the additional test on Alloy I), and will have
a 50% chance of achieving success in both cases. His total expected cost is therefore
$2.50. If Paul chooses not to conduct the extra test on Alloy I and instead switch to
Alloy II immediately, he would have the same expected cost and success. In fact, for
any common ratio less than 0.6 in the geometric series used to describe the succession
of costs in alloy testing, the option to conduct one more test on Alloy I will be more
attractive, and for a common ratio greater than 0.6, switching to Alloy II will be
more attractive.
In this manner, Bayesian updating can be used to make decisions regarding when
to stop a low-performing research project and begin another. More generally however,
Bayes' Theorem enables researchers to make a broader range of decisions than simply
when to end one series of tests and begin another. As long as the cost of each test
can be estimated, the range of possible test outcomes can be characterized, the con-
ditional probability on each test result is known, and a value can be assigned to each
possible state of knowledge, then it is possible to use Bayes' Theorem to decide what
experiment to run next among any number of experiments and perform constrained
optimizations, either maximizing research benefits for a given set of resources, or
minimizing cost to achieve a given level of research benefits. To do this, one would
make expected benefits or expected costs the top-level measure of a Bayesian network
and evaluate each possible decision pathway computationally to find the path that
maximizes the expected benefit to costs ratio.
Most of the conditions needed to make Bayesian networks work are usually present
in a research program. The costs of experiments are routinely estimated by researchers
and funding agencies. Except in very basic research, the range of potential outcomes
can usually be characterized- experiments are frequently designed to produced quan-
tified evidence that must fall within a given numeric range, and even experiments
that look for qualitative evidence can often describe the results within predetermined
lexicographic bounds. Knowing the conditional probability on each test result is a
pre-requisite of good experimental design- without any knowledge of the uncertainty
on an experimental result, it's nearly impossible to know the informative value of an
experiment, and typically, rigorous uncertainty analysis is built into the experiment
itself. The last requirement, assigning a value to each state of knowledge, is generally
done implicitly rather than explicitly and quantitatively. A discussion of the success
space is discussed further in Section 3.2.1.
3.2.1 Defining Success
One of the main difficulties cited in evaluating the value of research outcomes is that
research discoveries themselves provide no direct benefits- it's only when the new
knowledge is applied through the creation of new processes, products, or regulations
that ultimate benefits are created in the form of reduced costs, new goods, or saved
lives.
This disconnect creates problems for a number of reasons:
1. There are often significant delays between when research is performed and when
ultimate outcomes are realized.
2. Research outcomes are frequently used by actors other than the agency that
initiated the research.
3. Sometimes the purpose of research is only to inform new research pathways,
creating even more disconnect between the research activity and ultimate out-
comes.
The inability to directly measure success is not an insurmountable barrier. Expert
and peer review panels routinely evaluate the importance of research based upon
agency priorities and research relevance. So long as it is possible to estimate the
relative value of outcomes, it is possible to give weight to different regions of success
space and perform optimizations.
Ultimately, the value of research outcomes are tied to the actions taken with those
outcomes. As an illustrative example, let's examine the following case:
An entrepreneur has rented a booth at a county fair and is deciding what to sell
at the booth. The entrepreneur has two options: a lemonade stand or a hot cocoa
stand. His action set is mutually exclusive- he cannot sell both types of drinks, only
one. Prior to making his decision however, the entrepreneur does not know what the
weather will be for the day. For simplicity, let's suppose that the weather is a binary
variable with two possible values: hot or cold.
The entrepreneur estimates that if he sets up a lemonade stand and the weather
is hot, he will receive a payout of V1, but if the weather is cold, he will receive a lower
payout of V2 . If instead the entrepreneur sets up a hot cocoa stand, he will receive
a low payout, V3 in the event of hot weather, but a higher payout of V4 in the event
of cold weather. Prior to making the decision of what type of stand to set up, the
entrepreneur has imperfect knowledge of what the weather will be.
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Figure 3-1: The Value of Information
The lines connecting Vi to V2 and V3 to V4 represent the expected value of setting
up a lemonade stand and a hot cocoa stand respectively. When the probability of of
hot weather is high, the lemonade stand has a higher expected value than the cocoa
stand, and vice versa- when the probability of cold weather (the complement of the
probability of hot weather) is high, the cocoa stand has a higher expected payout. At
some probability, Po = vv4, the expected value of both actions are equal.
The line between V and V4 represents the expected value of acting with perfect
information. When the weather is known with absolute certainty, as is the case when
Po = 0 and PO = 1, there is no difference between the value of acting with perfect
information and the value of acting with current information (current information is
already perfect). When there is uncertainty however, a difference, Q appears. For
example, if the probability of hot weather is 50% (roughly where the Q line is drawn
in Figure 3.2.1), the expected value with imperfect knowledge is the average of Vi
and V2 (the entrepreneur chooses his best option, the lemonade stand, and receives V1
with probability j and V2 with probability 1), while the expected value with perfect
information is the average of V and V4 (with probability j the entrepreneur will
be informed that the weather will be hot and he will set up a lemonade stand and
receive V1, and with complementary probability j the entrepreneur will be informed
that the weather will be cold and he will set up a lemonade stand and receive V4).
The difference between these two expected values is Q, the amount the entrepreneur
should be willing to pay to obtain perfect information.
There are three major differences between this simplified example and real-world
applications.
1. In research, perfect information is never obtained, only sample information.
2. The action set (i.e. lemonade stand vs cocoa stand) is larger, and in many
applications, is parameterized such that there are an infinite number of possible
actions over a range of actions.
3. The state of knowledge (i.e.weather is a binary variable and the state of knowl-
edge is a simple statement of the probability of one outcome) is more complex.
Almost all real-world applications will involve a state of knowledge that has two
parameters (typically mean and variance) or more. For example, rather than
represent weather as "Hot" or "Cold" it would be more accurate to describe
it as a degree temperature, and the state of knowledge would be a probability
distribution function across the range of temperatures.
Perfect Information vs. Sample Information
To illustrate the example of the difference between perfect information and sample
information, let's return to the coin-flip example with Paul. Suppose again that a
coin is either heads or tails biased such that the biased side comes up 75% of the time.
Paul is asked to predict which side of the coin it is biased towards. If he predicts
that the coin is heads-biased and he is correct, he will receive $8. If he predicts that
the coin is tails-biased and is correct, he will receive $4. If he predicts incorrectly,
either heads or tails, he receives nothing. In other words, Vi = 8, V2 = 0, V3 = 0, and
V4 _=4.
Paul initially believes that there is a 50% chance the coin is heads-biased, and
50% tails-biased. He asked how much he would be willing to pay to be able to flip
the coin once prior to making his prediction.
Paul's highest valued action without new information is to predict heads, which
offers an expected value of 4. After the flip, there is a 50% chance probability that the
outcome will have been tails, in which case Paul's highest valued action is to predict
tails with an expected value of 3 (the probability that the coin is tails-biased is 75%).
There is also a 50% probability after the flip that the outcome will have been heads,
in which case Paul's highest valued action is to predict heads with an expected value
of 6. Paul's expected value given sample information is j * 3 + 1 * 6 = 4.5. Thus,2 2
Paul is willing to pay 0.5 for his first flip. Similar calculations show that after a tails
result, Paul's willingness to pay for a coin flip goes up to 0.7, while after a heads
result it declines to 0.4. This is as expected, since the value of information peaks at
P =, where the expected values of predicting tails and heads are equal.
Expanded Action Sets and Complex Knowledge States
Modifying the refreshment stand example to include a broader action set is simple.
Adding new action possibilities (in Figure 3.2.1 the new option is a hot dog stand
with constant payout, E[V] = V5 = V6 ), does not change the fundamental statement
of the problem, which is that for any state of knowledge there is an expected value
based upon the optimal action given that state of knowledge, and that changes in a
state of knowledge are valued only in as much as they lead to states of knowledge
that have a higher expected value. With the inclusion of a hot dog stand in the en-
trepreneur's mutually exclusive action set, the value of knowledge states in the middle
of the probability range has increased, but no paradigmatic change has occurred.
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Figure 3-2: The Value of Information, Expanded Action Set
Similarly, increasing the complexity of the state of knowledge does not fundamen-
tally change the problem. The broader the set of possible states of knowledge, the
more states there are to assign valuations to, but the calculation of expected value
remains as it was before. As long as it is remembered that the benefit of research is
dependent upon actions, providing valuations to states of knowledge should be rela-
tively simple. Depicting the action set should be the starting point of any attempt
at assigning values to states of knowledge- at its heart, determining the value of a
knowledge state is simply answering two questions: given this knowledge, what is the
optimal action to take, and what would be the expected result of that action?
Expert Review Panels
Given the difficulties in quantitatively measuring research outcomes, it is impor-
tant to develop reliable subjective means of assessing the value of different states of
knowledge. Expert review is similar to the standard practice of peer review, with
the exception that expert review groups include not only peer researchers, but also a
broad range of other experts, including members of other scientific fields, economists,
lawyers, policy analysts, and other end-users of scientific research. The increased
breadth of expert review panels relative to peer review gives them the unique ability
to judge not only the scientific merit of a research project, but also its value to society
at large.
Many federal agencies maintain standing expert review boards to provide inde-
pendent analysis of agency programs and decisions. These boards regularly make
judgments on how well the agency is setting research priorities and managing its
resources. Given their availability and capability, expert review boards make ideal
bodies for supplying Bayesian networks with valuations of knowledge states. The
main focus of these expert panels would not be to assess the scientific merit of a
project (an assessment that can be left to traditional peer review), but instead to
estimate what the benefits of knowledge derived from a project would be. For most
projects, this may be a straightforward estimate of the economic benefits provided
by an improved process or product. For a military research project, this may involve
estimating how well a new weapons system would improve military capabilities rel-
ative to other potential weapons systems. For a project serving the Environmental
Protection Agency or the Food and Drug Administration, this might mean estimating
the costs and benefits of regulation formed on the basis of research.
In some cases, expert review panels might even be asked to speculate about the
benefits provided by basic research. In strict terms, the valuation of research should
be derived from the products, processes, and future research that it enables and the
definable benefits that these developments provide- but for basic research (as defined
Section 1.2.1) it will not be practical to characterize the new research avenues opened
by different research outcomes, in which case it will be easier to ask expert panels to
directly assess the value of basic research outcomes.
3.2.2 Obtaining Priors
After giving value to research outcomes, the next step is to solicit a prior distribution
on each of the relevant parameters of an experiment. In the simple coin-flip examples
discussed previously, naive priors were used- it was assumed at the start of each
example that no knowledge existed about the bias of the coins, validity of alloys, or
future temperatures. In the real world, prior beliefs exist. They come from objec-
tive sources, such as previous experimental evidence, and subjective sources, such as
expert opinion.
More generally, expert opinion and theoretical knowledge are needed to establish
a model of the world. In the hypothetical situations worked through thus far, the
model of the world was given as part of the example, i.e.there is a coin that must
either have a heads or tails bias of 75%. By establishing this framework, it was made
clear what the conditional independencies were between the observations (heads or
tails results) and the hypotheses (heads or tails bias). In real applications, it will
often be necessary to solicit statements of conditional probability from experts in
order to create the links between nodes. This will not always be the case- in some
research projects (human drug trials may be a good example), uncertainty analysis
is part and parcel with the experiment, and the likelihood functions that should
be used to update the prior distribution are self-evident. In other cases however,
the statistical power of the experiment cannot be objectively derived either before
or after the experiment is conducted. Researchers must provide some estimate of
their confidence that an experimental result is free from error. This estimate will
depend upon both aleatory and epistemic sources of uncertainty. Aleatory sources of
uncertainty may be thought of as imprecision in measurement instruments, natural
variability in tested samples, and so on. In other words, aleatory uncertainty is the
variability between results that would occur if the experiment were run multiple times
using the exact same experimental setup, and as such, aleatory uncertainty can often
be determined beforehand through calibration. Epistemic sources of uncertainty may
be thought of as errors in the execution or design of the experiment. Sources of
epistemic uncertainty are generally unobserved and if observed, corrected. They may
include experimenter error, poor control of experimental conditions, and so on. As it
is unknown how often and to what degree experimenter error affects a test result, it
is difficult to depict some sources of epistemic uncertainty. More interestingly, some
sources of epistemic uncertainty can be predicted beforehand but cannot be removed.
For example, suppose an experimenter tests a drug on laboratory mice and obtains a
result. As a measurement of the effect of the drug on mice, the experimenter might
have a very precise answer. But no matter how rigorously the experiment was run,
there will always be uncertainty in extrapolating the evidence from the experiment
to the relationship the experimenter is truly interested in: the effect of the drug on
humans. Thus, in determining the conditional probability of drug efficacy in humans
given a result in mice experiments, it is not enough to simply observe the results in
mice, it is necessary to solicit from the researcher some form of statistical inference
that can be used to relate the evidence to the parameter of interest.
Peer Review Panels
A natural way of soliciting both prior beliefs and conditional relationships between
variables is a peer review panel. Because the questions being asked are technical in
nature, it is better to bring in a greater degree of specialization than one would find
in an expert review panel.
Peer review assessment in this context should be limited to depicting the current
state of knowledge on the variables of interest in an experiment, estimating the un-
certainty on the potential results of experiments, and ensuring that all the potential
results are characterized by the belief network. It is unnecessary to try and estimate
the societal value of given results except in the case of basic research when an expert
review panel felt that it lacked the technical expertise necessary to appreciate the
value of an experiment. Peer review panels tasked with coming up with conditional
probability relationships and prior beliefs should include at least one statistician to
ensure that the panel understands the nature of the questions they are being asked
to answer.
3.2.3 Principal-Agent Relationships
When soliciting prior beliefs or conditional independencies, a problem may arise if
the research in question originated with, or is being performed by, an outside party.
In these cases of extramural research, it may often be that the extramural party has
the most informed understanding of the research problem, and is therefore the source
of the most accurate priors and conditional probabilities.
What creates the problem is that the extramural researcher and the funding body
may not share the same interests. The priors and conditional probabilities that the
researcher submits (in short, his expectations for success), will factor into the decision
of not only whether or not the research project should be begun, but also whether or
not it is discontinued as new evidence comes in. While the funding body seeks only
to maximize the expected return on its research dollar, a researcher has a self-interest
in seeing his own research funded, regardless of the return that it might provide for
the funding body.
This problem that forms when there is asymmetric information and dissimilar
interests between two contracting parties is called a principal-agent problem. The
common manifestation is in labor markets, where an employer hires employees, but
has imperfect information on the employee's capabilities and level of effort.
In the context of research and development, the agency problem at hand is that
the principal (the funding body), has a willingness to pay for research that depends
upon the expected value of the research and the effort of the agent (the researcher),
while the agent, who has insight into the expected value and control over his own
level of effort, has a different calculation of self-interest than that of the principal.
In most principal-agent problems, the primary concern is not the agent's personal
estimation of how much benefit he can potentially provide to the principal, but instead
the main focus is on the second part of the problem, incentivizing the agent to provide
effort when the principal lacks the means to directly observe effort. In this sense,
the research agency dilemma problem is unique: it is not generally observed that
researchers fail to provide effort- a more common complaint is that funding requests
exaggerate the potential benefits that the funds can provide.
Still, the form of the solution is the same. In problems where effort must be
induced, a typical solution is to replace lump-sum payments with piece-rate payment.
In the optimal solution, an agent's total compensation package is the combination of
a lump-sum payment (which can take both positive and negative values) and a reward
that is proportional to the output provided: Payout = C1+ C2 x. C2, the fraction of an
agent's expected compensation that comes from the output/effort-proportional term
is increasing with four factors: the marginal benefit created by marginal effort, the
accuracy with which effort can be assessed, the agent's responsiveness to incentives,
and the agent's tolerance to risk [16].
In cases where honesty must be incentivized, the solution is to replace lump-sum
payments with a payment that is proportional to the absolute difference between the
output prediction given by the agent and the actual output. A payout function of
the form Payout = C3 - C4 | x - e I incentivizes the agent to report the median
expectation of output, while a payout function of the form Payout = C3 - C4 (x - e)2
incentivizes the agent to report the mean expectation of output.
Once again however, in the optimal solution, C4 is increasing with four factors: the
marginal benefit created by marginal increase in accuracy of the agent's expectation,
the accuracy with which the difference between the expectation and the result can be
assessed, the agent's responsiveness to incentives, and the agent's tolerance to risk.
It is the last of these four factors that creates biggest difficulty in solving the
principal-agent problem. Research grants are on the scale of hundreds of thousands
of dollars. It would be infeasible to loan researchers hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars to conduct research, and then only compensate them if the results were useful
to the funding body or if the research yielded the results the researcher expected.
Researchers do not have such high tolerance to risk. We should expect an optimized
C4 to be very low and dominated almost entirely by a researcher's willingness to risk
his own money in return for obtaining a research grant. Also, a significantly high C4
would incentivize researchers to falsify results (decrease the accuracy with which the
difference between the expectation and the result can be assessed).
Potential methods of resolving the agency problem discussed here will be revisited,
along with methods of expert solicitation, in Chapter 7.
3.2.4 Empirical Updating
After every new experimental result, empirical updating should be performed using
Bayes' theorem in conjunction with the prior distributions and likelihood functions
solicited from research staff and experts. Because this updating may require difficult
integrations to find the normalizing constant, Pr(B), two implementation methods
have been developed.
Conjugate Priors
If the prior distribution of the variable being updated is conjugate with the likelihood
distribution being used to update it, the updating is a straightforward process where
the hyperparameters of the prior and likelihood function are used to determine the
hyperparameters of the posterior distribution. Conjugate priors greatly simplify the
updating process, and fortunately, most natural sources of uncertainty yield distribu-
tions for which there are several conjugate counterparts.
A common distribution used in statistics is the normal distribution, A(p, oa),
which has the probability density function
f(x pp)= F?_exp P(X - A)) (3.3)
If a conjugate prior, 7r is a normal distribution with hyperparameters m and p
tracking a parameter, p
7r(p I mn, p) = P exp p _T2 (3.4)
and a set of measurements, x1, . .. , x, are independently and identically obtained
from a normal distribution with unknown mean, y, and known precision, p, then the
likelihood function will be
x1,. .. , xn) = f ( | xn) =exp 2x(m -) 2 (3.5)
i=1
and the posterior, 7r( I m/, p/) will be a normal distribution with hyperparameters
M/=mp + np and, pl= p-+np (3.6)
p+np
Similar relationships exist for likelihood functions with known yt and unknown p,
unknown y and unknown p, and many others, such as lognormal, gamma-normal,
and multi-dimensional normal distributions.
One advantage of using conjugate priors is that the updating process is transpar-
ent and easily understood by those with limited statistical backgrounds. It is easy
to track changes in hyperparameters and understand the significance of the updating
process. This makes Bayesian networks more accessible to researchers, more eas-
ily implementable, and better helps researchers to design or modify experiments to
maximize the expected value of an experiment.
A disadvantage of using conjugate priors is that they may not be the best reflection
of prior beliefs or evidential forms. Even though many conjugate distributions depict
common, natural processes, they are still a small subset of all possible distributions.
Therefore, in many circumstances, it will be necessary to use numerical methods.
Monte Carlo Assessment
Monte Carlo methods are a class of algorithms that generate large numbers of ran-
dom samples from distributions as a means of approximating the features of the
distribution itself. They are particularly useful in the evaluation of integrals- ran-
dom sampling of points over the domain that is being integrated will yield an estimate
of the integral's value. This feature of Monte Carlo numerical methods is particularly
useful for evaluating the normalizing constant used in the updating process, fy (y)
(or Pr(B) if the discrete form is being used), which is the integral of the product of
the prior and likelihood functions over the relevant domain of the parameter being
tracked.
Monte Carlo methods are far more computationally cumbersome than the an-
alytical methods enabled by conjugate priors, but are necessary in most realistic
applications of Bayesian decision making.
3.3 Chapter Summary
Belief networks are a type of linked-node system, with the nodes representing pa-
rameters, variables, hypotheses, or forms of evidence, and the linkages between nodes
representing statements of conditional probability. Using Bayes' theorem, changes in
the state of one node can be used to inform or "update" the states of other nodes.
Depending on the types of probabilistic distributions used to define the nodes and
their relationships, the process of updating can be simple and analytical, or require
more computationally intensive methods. In the context of research decision making,
the driving concept behind the use of belief networks is to assign societal value to
nodal states (or, equally, define a new node that reflects societal value), and thereby
connect research activities (which change nodal states) to ultimate outcomes and
benefits. To establish a belief network, two pieces of information are needed: a set
of prior beliefs (initial values for the nodes) and conditional probability relationships
(the connections between the nodes). These can be solicited from expert and peer-
review boards, among other methods, though it should be noted that soliciting from
researchers who have a personal interest in project funding may create adverse in-
centives. To use belief networks to their full potential, one more element is needed:
a method of assigning value to nodal states. The value of a state is defined by the
expected value of the actions that can be taken in that state. Similarly, the expected
value of changing states (and thus the expected value of a research activity) can be
defined as the difference, between states, of the expected value of the highest val-
ued action. With this final element, belief networks enable cost-benefit analysis and
optimization.
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Chapter 4
Description of the Case Study
In order to demonstrate the potential of Bayesian networks as a tool for improving
research and development outcomes, we have applied the method to a prototypical
case study: the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, Project
Number 06-038, The Development and Production of a Functionally Graded Com-
posite for Lead-Bismuth Service. Funded by public grant (Award Number DE-FC07-
061D14742) the project is led by Dr. Ronald Ballinger of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology in collaboration with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and
the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Begun in April of 2006, the project investigates
whether a functionally graded composite of T91 steel and Fe-12Cr-2Si alloy, manufac-
tured using standard commercial practices, can meet the operating requirements of a
liquid lead cooled nuclear reactor at temperatures greater than existing operational
limit of 547 C[14]. If successful, this bilayered alloy could be used to manufacture
fuel rod cladding and coolant piping in a lead-bismuth-eutectic-cooled fast-reactor.
Originally, it was intended that Dr. Ballinger's research project would last three
years and conclude in April 2009. However, as a consequence of intermittent funding
authorization, the project's progress has been delayed by at least one year. As a
result, this thesis lacks the time horizon necessary to conduct Bayesian monitoring to
the full extent that would be expected of a federal agency or oversight body. However,
we deem that sufficient progress has been made by the case study to provide a valid
proof of concept and justify further attention.
Project 06-038 has many characteristics that make it ideal for a prototypical case
study. The project is an appropriate example of "hard" science: it employs the
scientific method and provides quantitative evidence through experimentation. It is
a good representation of the basic and applied research to which Bayesian methods
offer the greatest potential for improvement: the project is neither theoretical (in
which so little is known about the possible results that it is difficult to characterize the
project's activities into a belief network) nor a mature development project (in which
so much is known that the project's results are more deterministic than probabilistic).
Finally, the project is concerned with multiple parameters- corrosion, diffusion, yield
strength, etc- and thus provides an implementation challenge that is sufficiently
complex without obscuring the main purpose of the case study, which is a proof of
concept demonstration.
4.1 Motivation for Alloy Development
Lead-bismuth cooled nuclear reactors offer several design advantages over comparable
fast-reactor designs. Molten lead has favorable heat transfer and heat capacity char-
acteristics, and its low melting point, high boiling point, and stability in air and water
make it relatively safer than molten sodium for use as a reactor coolant[1]. Unfortu-
nately, lead cooled advanced reactor systems have been historically limited by the high
rate of corrosion of nickel-based alloys in the lead environment. This limitation pre-
cludes the use of many standard reactor materials, including the set of stainless steels
typically employed in a reactor's primary loop construction. Consequently, existing
materials are only suitable up to 550 C, a limit that reduces economic attractiveness
and prevents lead-bismuth reactors from realizing the full thermal efficiency potential
of their design.
The most demanding material problem occurs in the fuel cladding. Fuel cladding
is a thin metal sheath that surrounds the fuel and maintains the fuel rod's structural
integrity during reactor operation. Due to thermal and neutronic requirements in the
reactor core, cladding must be very thin, on the order of a fraction of a millimeter,
but also thick enough to withstand corrosion and meet strength requirements. To
make lead-cooled reactors a viable design choice, there is a great need to develop
alloys that satisfy a demanding set of material property requirements.
Previous testing suggested that the use iron-chromium-silicon alloys might raise
the temperature limit currently faced by lead cooled designs to 650 C or more[15]. Fe-
Cr-Si alloys develop stable protective films over a range of oxygen potentials, provide
strong resistance to corrosion, and do not exhibit a vulnerability to stress corrosion
cracking.
Based upon this preliminary evidence, a solution to the materials limitations of
lead-cooled reactors was proposed: a bilayer composite, made of an inner, structural
layer of T91 (a nickel-free steel), and an outer, corrosion resistant layer of Fe-12Cr-2Si.
This functionally graded composite might meet both the structural and corrosion re-
quirements of the lead-bismuth environment. The dimensions of the cladding product
form to be tested were chosen such that they would be compatible with the estab-
lished fuel cladding dimensions to be used in the Department of Energy's Advanced
Burner Reactor program. Furthermore, it was decided that the product would only
be produced using conventional commercial practices, so as to demonstrate readiness
for immediate use as a prototype.
4.2 Project Tasks
To be successful as a product form, the proposed functionally graded composite needs
to guarantee, to an acceptable degree of certainty, that its material properties and
specified product dimensions are sufficient to maintain the clad's structural interity
over the course of a three-year fuel operational lifetime. Success therefore depends
upon a number of factors, including the corrosion rate of Fe-12Cr-2Si in high temper-
ature lead, the diffusion rate of silicon between layers during operation, the dilution
of silicon during production, the mechanical strength of the inner structural layer,
the commercial fabricability of the product form, and, as an ancillary factor, the
commercial cost of the product form itself. Project 06-038 investigates each of these
factors.
4.2.1 Product Form Procurement
Two product forms, piping and cladding, will be produced using standard commercial
practices. Of the two, the cladding faces the more stringent materials requirements,
and so the focus of the case study is primarily on the challenges faced by the clad
product form.
The cladding will be produced in a series of stages. In the first stage, ingots of T91
and Fe-12Cr-2.5Si will be obtained. The T91 ingot will be processed into an extrusion
billet through direct melting, and the Fe-12Cr-2.5Si will be custom forged into a billet
and then fabricated into weld wire. In the second stage, the T91 will have a weld
overlay applied to its outer diameter using the weld wire fabricated from the Fe-12Cr-
2.5Si billet. Multiple weld passes will be made in order to build up an outer layer
of corrosion resistant material. In the third stage, the weld-overlaid extrusion billet
will be reduced through a combination of hot extrusion and roto-rolling (pilgering) to
achieve pre-drawing dimensions for the cladding form. In the last stage, the product
will be tube drawn to its final product dimensions. The final product form will be
a hollow cylinder with an inner diameter of .257" and an outer diameter of .28". It
consists of a .02" inner structural layer of T91, and a .003" outer, corrosion resistant
layer of Fe-12Cr-2Si.
The procurement process is being performed entirely through commercial met-
alwork providers and other contracted services. Both fabricability and commercial
product cost are relevant to the success of the experiment and can be considered vari-
ables in the belief network affecting the value of the research project, to be updated
as new service providers are identified and production tasks are completed.
4.2.2 Corrosion Testing
The primary material requirement of the alloy is corrosion resistance. Over the life-
time of the cladding, some thickness of the protective layer will become corroded
away through contact with the molten lead. In order for the product to be viable, the
corrosion rate must be small enough such that at the end of clad lifetime the outer
layer still offers protection to the inner structural layer.
Static corrosion tests will be used to determine the corrosion resistance of the
alloy. 100mm diameter disk samples will be immersed in a molten lead bath within
a high temperature furnace. The furnace will be equipped with an oxygen control
and monitoring system to maintain oxygen potentials within specified levels. 1000-hr
tests will be conducted over a broad range of oxygen potentials and a temperature
range of 600 C to 700 C. After testing, samples will be analyzed using standard
metallographic and scanning electron microscopy, as well as X-ray techniques. These
analyses will yield an estimate of the long-run corrosion rate of the alloy. More details
on the testing facility are included in Appendix E.
4.2.3 Diffusion Testing
Because the silicon concentration of the inner structural layer is 0.4% while the Si
concentration in the outer corrosion resistant layer is expected to be 2%, there will
be diffusion of silicon between the two layers during reactor operation. In order for
the outer layer to maintain its corrosion resistant properites, it must have a silicon
concentration of over 1.25%. Thus, over the lifetime of the cladding, some thickness
of the protective layer will become degraded due to the loss of silicon.
The change in silicon concentration over time can be described using a diffusion
constant, Dsi, and Fick's Second Law
= Ds (4.1)
8t O x2
Solving Fick's Second Law in a one-dimensional setting yields a silicon concentra-
tion profile
C Cvg + CAxerf( ) (4.2)
v4Dsit
Thus for a given diffusion constant, Dsi, and length of time, t, there is a thickness,
x, of the protection layer for which the silicon concentration, C, is degraded below
1.25%.
The diffusion of silicon in iron follows an Arrhenius relationship, and the diffusion
constant, Dsi, can be described by
Dsi = Doe RT (4.3)
where Do is the diffusion coefficient, Q is the activation energy for the diffusion
of silicon in iron, R is the gas constant (1.986*10-3 kcal/mol-K), and T is the tem-
perature of the material in Kelvin.
Diffusion tests were performed to obtain an estimate on the diffusion coefficient.
Test samples were created by Hot Isostatic Pressing couples of T91 and Fe-12Cr-2Si
together at 1050 C for five hours. The couples were then sealed and aged in a furnace
for 274, 495.2, and 1219.8 hours at 800'C. Samples were then removed and analyzed
for silicon content- the results were fitted to an error function profile to obtain an
estimate on Do.
4.2.4 Dilution Testing
Loss of silicon from the protective layer will also occur during processing. During the
weld overlay process there will be migration of silicon from the weld wire to the T91
billet. Although there is no explicit measurement of dilution of silicon, analysis of the
as-received product forms will provide a useful estimate of the migration of silicon
that should be expected from commercial processing.
4.2.5 Mechanical Strength Testing
Because molten lead coolant is not pressurized, the mechanical strength requirements
of the cladding product form are not as demanding a condition as they would be
in most light water reactors. In the lead-coolant system, the primary structural
requirement placed on the clad is that it must support its own weight, for which T91
should be sufficient: at temperatures of 700'C, T91 has an ultimate tensile strength
of 200MPa and a yield strength of 160MPa[25, 26].
Although the mechanical properties or T91 are known to a high degree of cer-
tainty, there is a risk that the carbon in the T91 steel will defuse to the outer pro-
tective layer. It is unclear to what extent carbon depletion in the structural layer
will weaken the clad, and so the couples used previously in diffusion testing will un-
dergo NANO-hardness testing on a Hysitron nanoindenter. Hardness testing should
not only provide an estimate on the diffusion of carbon between the layers, but also
reveal the mechanical properties of the T91 after some amount of carbon migration
has occured. The structural properties of the product forms will also be explored at
600'C and 700'C in the form of tensile and 1000hr stress rupture tests.
4.3 Chapter Summary
For our case study, we selected an ongoing research project at MIT being funded
through the Department of Energy. The project is testing the corrosion, diffusion,
dilution, and mechanical properties of a bilayered alloy product for use in a special-
ized environment. The project has a clear motivation and easily characterized test
results- as such provides an ideal candidate for a proof of concept demonstration.
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Chapter 5
Applying Bayes Theorem to NERI
Project 06-038
To model a research project using a Bayesian network, it is necessary to obtain three
key pieces of information through expert elicitation:
* A definition of success or method of knowledge valuation that relates societal
benefit to the parameters being explored by the experimental activities.
" Statements of prior belief on the parameters being tracked by the Bayesian
network.
" Statements of conditional probability (likelihood functions) that relate the pa-
rameters tracked to experimental observations.
Prior beliefs and likelihood functions were solicited from the project's principal
researcher, Professor Ronald Ballinger, and his graduate assistant, Michael Short. A
method of knowledge valuation, which would normally be solicited from the funding
body or an expert review panel, was created in consultation with Prof. Ballinger and
Mr. Short.
5.1 Choice of Parameters
In order to provide the clearest possible application of Bayesian networks and avoid
unnecessary complexity, some relevant parameters were not tracked. Corrosion and
diffusion behavior were chosen to be tracked, while fabricability, cost, dilution, and
mechanical strength were not. Before continuing, it is important to explain why
this particular choice was made and provide a brief description of how the ignored
parameters could be added as nodes to create a fuller Bayesian network.
5.1.1 Corrosion and Diffusion
It is self-evident why corrosion behavior was chosen as a parameter to track. Cor-
rosion resistance is the primary motivation for alloy development and occupies the
attention of the large majority of the project's proposed experimental activities. The
corrosion behavior of the Fe-12Cr-2Si overlay is far and away the single largest source
of uncertainty in determining alloy viability and because of this, it would have been
impossible to exclude corrosion from the Bayesian network and still obtain meaningful
results.
Diffusion warranted attention for two reasons. Firstly, although the diffusion of
silicon between the product's bilayers is is of secondary importance in determining
the alloy's viability, it still represents a significant source of uncertainty and thus
merits tracking. Secondly, diffusion behavior is one of the few areas in which, as of
writing, the project has returned experimental results. As such, diffusion represents
one of the few areas where a clear demonstration of Bayesian updating can be made.
The explicit corrosion parameter tracked was the long run corrosion rate, as ex-
trapolated from the measurement of material lost over the course of a corrosion test.
The explicit diffusion parameter tracked was the estimate on D, determined by er-
ror function fitting of the measured silicon concentrations within the tested diffusion
couples.
5.1.2 Other Parameters
Next to corrosion, fabricability and cost are the largest determinants of alloy viability.
To date, the majority of the project's activities have been devoted to procurement
efforts, obtaining alloy billets and contracting for materials processing services with
various metal working companies. The question of whether the proposed product
form can be produced at reasonable cost with a sufficiently low rate of defects is
one of the most important considerations of the project, and the process of soliciting
offers and contracting for services is an important means of information gathering.
Were fabricability and cost to be treated as parameters in our Bayesian network,
they could be described using three quantitative parameters: the probability that the
product form can be produced at all (a parameter that takes values between 0 and
1 and can be estimated as the top-level measure of a fault tree that includes each
processing stage as a node), the rate of defect per unit length of final product form
(or alternately a probability distribution on the largest undetected defect per fuel rod
length), and the cost per unit length of final product form.
Fabricability and cost are important determinants of alloy viability: if the func-
tionally graded composite cannot be produced at all, has too great a rate of failure
due to defects in the product form, or can only be procured at a cost that inhibits
commercial application, then the usefulness of the alloy is diminished.
Despite the importance of these parameters, it was decided not to include them
in the case study's analysis. While procurement represents a significant source of
uncertainty for this project, it is not a good representation of the traditional process
of research that this thesis is interested in. The forms of evidence are often simple,
binary results ('Works' vs 'Doesn't work') that can be easily translated into project
success or failure without the aid of belief networks, and because the marginal cost
of soliciting estimates from service providers is negligible, it is unclear how Bayesian
decision making would improve current practices. Fabricating the alloy product forms
is more similar to capital procurement (like the construction of a testing facility) than
research and development, and capital procurement, even in the context of research
and development, is already well served by existing decision-making practices and
efficiency metrics.
The remaining parameters, dilution and mechanical strength, were not tracked
for a combination of reasons. Firstly the contribution of these parameters to the
uncertainty on alloy viability is small. Dilution of silicon occurs primarily during the
weld overlay process in the production stage. During the first welding pass, dilution
will occur over a thickness of roughly only .032" of the material, but subsequent weld
passes will not make direct contact with the T91 and dilution will therefore not be a
concern. Also, because the weld-overlay process occurs while the product is still in a
billet form and has an outer diameter of roughly 10", the effect of dilution will be even
further diminished: after welding, the product will be reduced through extrusion and
tube drawing down to an outer diameter of .28", nearly a forty-fold reduction in size,
and the thickness affected by dilution during welding will be reduced proportionally,
putting it on the order of .001". This places a physical upper-bound on the effects of
dilution and limits its potential impact on the product form's viability. Furthermore,
because the weld-wire has a slightly higher concentration of silicon than the aimed for
final protective layer concentration of 2%, the effects of dilution are well compensated
for and are not expected to provide a significant threat to alloy validity.
Mechanical strength is also a minor contributor to the uncertainty of alloy viability.
The material properties of T91 are known to a high degree of certainty, and it is
expected that at 650'C, T91 will the meet the cladding yield strength requirements[25,
26]. Furthermore, the project does not devote significant attention to either the issue
of silicon migration during the processing stage or the mechanical properties of T91.
Evidence of dilution is treated as an ancillary task, and the confirmatory mechanical
properties testing is effectively a product of convenience: the samples already exist as
a consequence of diffusion testing, and little experimental work is needed to provide
an estimate. There is no need to recreate the precision of the older, in-depth studies
of T91.
If dilution were a tracked parameter, it could be integrated with the measurement
of diffusion to obtain an estimate of the thickness of the protective layer that loses its
corrosion resistant properties over the course of the clad life. If mechanical strength
were a tracked parameter, it would be used to create a probability that the composite
alloy has sufficient mechanical strength to maintain its structural integrity over the
course of a fuel rod lifetime.
5.2 Definition of Success Space
Using the selected parameters, the condition for experimental success, "Alloy Viabil-
ity," was defined in the following way:
If utilized in a commercial lead-bismuth reactor, the cladding product form would
be expected to remain in the reactor environment for three years (26280 hours) at
650'C. From the corrosion rate and the diffusion constant, we can extrapolate a total
thickness, TT, which is the sum of the thickness of the protective layer that has been
corroded away, Tc, and the thickness that has seen its silicon concentration fall below
1.25% due to diffusion into the structural layer, TD, over the course of the three years
of operation. If this extrapolated TT is less than the thickness of the protective layer
in the as-tested dimensions of the product (.003" /.0762mm), then the alloy will be
considered viable, if not, then it will be considered inviable.
Tc is easy to extrapolate from the corrosion rate. If the corrosion rate is given in
pm per hour, then Tc in mm is simply the corrosion rate multiplied by 26.28.
TD is a somewhat more difficult extrapolation. Using Equation 4.2 we can de-
termine that if C = 1.25, Cg = 1.2, and CA = 0.8 (the concentration of silicon in
the protective layer is 2.0% and the concentration of silicon in the structural layer is
0.4%), then Tc is equal to 0.055446 V4D8st. If Dsi is expressed in units of =, then
the total thickness degraded by diffusion, in mm, is equal to 10786.08 VDIs.
Because the parameter being updated is not the diffusion constant, Dsi, but
instead the diffusion coefficient, Do, it is necessary to relate Do to Dsi using Equa-
tion 4.3. Here, one complication is introduced: Q, the activation energy for diffusion
of silicon in iron, is not known with absolute certainty. Therefore, to track the effect
of a change in the estimate of Do, it is necessary to account for the uncertainty on
the estimate of Q as well.
Alternate definitions of alloy viability can be considered as well. For example, it
could be assumed that the thickness of the clad does not necessarily need to equal
the dimensions of the as-tested product form, but instead could be thicker or thinner,
with the achievement of thinner cladding having more value than that of thicker
cladding. For a given clad thickness, a certain set of reactor design options may
become available, with thinner cladding enabling a broader set of reactor designs.
The value of a given cladding would then be dependent on the set of reactor designs
it enabled, with the value of a set of reactor designs dependent on the characteristics of
the reactors, their economic advantages, waste generation rates, resource efficiencies
and so on. Alloy viability would then be described not as a simple boolean variable,
but instead as a set of multiple boolean variables representing the alloy's capability
of meeting the materials requirements of an array of reactor designs.
5.3 Valuation of Knowledge States
For simplicity and the purposes of demonstration, we have settled on a simple means
of valuation:
The direct benefit of an alloy is determined by the action set with the highest
expected value. In its simplest form, we can imagine the action set related to an alloy
to be "Use in Reactor Construction" or "Don't Use in Reactor Construction." For
the action, "Don't Use" we can assume the value of the alloy to be zero- without
some physical application of the alloy, there can be no societal benefit. For the "Use"
option we can imagine two potential payoffs: a benefit, B, incurred when a viable alloy
is used, and a harm, H, incurred when an inviable alloy is used. For example, using
a viable alloy in a lead-bisumth reactor would allow the reactor to achieve greater
thermal efficiency, producing benefit, while using an inviable alloy would result in
fuel failures, causing harm in the form of damage to and decreased utilization of the
reactor, as well as radiological dose to workers.
In a method identical to that described by Figure 3.2.1, we can construct expected
value curves for both actions:
V= B
Don't Use Alloy
V~ =0H
V=-H
Probability of Alloy Viability
Figure 5-1: Value of Alloy Actions as a Function of Probability of Viability, "80%
Standard"
If the H is equal to 4B, then the expected value of using the alloy is greater than
the value of not using the alloy and is equal to 5B[Pr(Viable)-0.8]. Under this 80%
standard, the alloy would only used if the probability of the alloy being viable is
greater than 80%- for all lower probabilities there is a higher expected value to not
using the alloy. Similarly, we could assume that H is equal to 999B, in which case the
Use Alloy action only has positive value for probabilities greater than 99.9%, with a
value function equal to 1000B[Pr(Viable)-0.999].
In our analysis, we use five different knowledge valuations, reflecting 80%, 90%,
95%, 99%, and 99.9% standards. This range of valuations should serve as good
proxies for many potential valuation schemes. In general, we may expect valuation
functions to be concerned with two quantities: the mean of a tracked parameter, and
the variance about that mean.
Though not done so here, in practice, it would also be necessary to add another
term to the value of different states of knowledge to obtain a complete picture of the
value of a research effort. In many instances, research does not yield direct benefits
such as a commercially viable alloy (nor is it necessarily the case that this research
project does so- that is merely an assumption made to give a hypothetical means of
valuation). More often, research enables other research, and for many projects, this
effect may be the dominant contributor to the value of a state of knowledge.
A similar process of valuation can be used when this is the case. Suppose the
results of a research project, A, affect the expected value of another research project,
B. Just as we developed the action set of "Use Alloy" and "Don't Use Alloy" to
assign a value to different states of knowledge concerning the viability of an alloy,
we could just as easily develop an action set of "Conduct Research Project B" and
"Don't Conduct Research Project B" and assign different values to conducting re-
search project B based upon the range of possible results from research project A.
The possible outcomes from research project A could be continuous (like the value
of the parameter TT), or discrete (such as "Viable" and "Inviable"). In either case
the benefit of project A can be fully described, with all value ultimately derived from
research created by societal benefits that are external to the research itself.
It is not expected that the next step immediately after the completion of NERI
Project 06-038 should be a decision of whether or not to use the functionally graded
composite in a commercial process- the alloy, not to mention molten lead reac-
tors themselves, are much too immature for such a leap. However, the methods of
knowledge valuation used here are expected to serve as a good proxy for the more
complete method of knowledge valuation that would take place with a broader and
more encompassing Bayesian network.
5.4 Obtained Priors
In order to construct our Bayesian network, prior beliefs were needed for three pa-
rameters: the diffusion coefficient, DO, the activation energy for diffusion of silicon in
iron, Q, and the corrosion rate, Crate.
5.4.1 Diffusion
Professor Ballinger reported that his beliefs on the diffusion behavior of silicon in an
iron-chromium alloy were primarily informed by earlier experiments performed by R.
J. Borg and D. Y. F. Lai. Specifically, Ballinger cited a 1970 paper in the Journal of
Applied Physics, Diffusion in a-Fe-Si Alloys[2].
Borg and Lai analyzed the diffusion of silicon in high purity iron at different
concentrations of silicon at varying temperatures. Through work with several samples,
estimates were made of both Do and Q (kcal). Using seven different concentrations
of silicon between 0% and 4.21%, Borg and Lai obtained estimates of Q between
52.2 and 52.7 kcal, and estimated Do to be 0.91278 for silicon concentrations of 2%.
Borg and Lai were fairly confident in the precision of their experiment and given the
quality of fit of their data, considered ±1 kcal and t a factor of 2 to be reasonable
uncertainties to apply to their estimates of Q and Do respectively.
Discussion with Ballinger revealed that he largely agreed with the Borg and Lai es-
timates of diffusion behavior and agreed with their uncertainty estimation. Ballinger
noted that as his product form was an alloy of iron and chromium, and not a pure iron
diffusion medium, the presence of chromium could affect the diffusion rate by chang-
ing the lattice structure of the alloy. Though the significance of this change could not
be determined a priori, Ballinger believed the likely consequence would be that the
diffusion constant would be slightly lower than Borg and Lai's estimate. Ballinger
therefore depicted his prior beliefs on the diffusion coefficient, Do, to be a normal
distribution, with a mean, y, equal to the Borg and Lai estimate of Do (0.91278 at
a silicon concentration of 2%) and with uncertainty such that i 0.45639 (50% of the
mean value) would serve as a 90% confidence interval on Do (implying a a of 0.234).
Prior beliefs therefore reflected the view that the mean value of diffusion would be
slightly smaller than the Borg and Lai estimate (the use of a linear confidence interval
rather than Borg and Lai's geometric confidence interval results in a slightly smaller
mean value on the distribution) and largely agreed with the uncertainty assessment
provided by Borg and Lai.
Ballinger's prior belief on Q was also largely informed by the estimates provided
by Borg and Lai. Ballinger depicted his prior belief on Q as a normal distribution with
a mean, y equal to 52.45 kcal, and a symmetric 90% confidence interval extending
to the most extreme values obtained by Borg and Lai, 52.2 kcal and 52.7 kcal. This
confidence interval implied a o of 0.12755.
5.4.2 Corrosion
Professor Ballinger reported that his beliefs on the corrosion behavior of Fe-12Cr-
2Si were primarily informed by a Ph.D thesis[15] completed in February 2006 by
Jeongyoun Lim, a former student. Lim tested fifteen different iron-chromium, iron-
silicon, and iron-chromium-silicon alloys in 600 C Pb-Bi eutectic for 100, 250, 300,
and 500 hours. After testing, the samples were analyzed using Secondary Electron
Microscopy, Energy Dispersive X-Ray analysis, Electron Probe Micro-analysis, X-ray
Diffraction, and X-ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy.
The primary focus of these tests was to characterize the morphology and quali-
tative aspects of the interaction layers formed by exposure to the molten lead envi-
ronment. Some quantitative estimates of the corrosion rate could be made using the
interaction layer thicknesses observed on the alloy samples, but nothing approaching
a definitive estimate of the corrosion rate was made. Lim's research suggested a syn-
ergistic effect between chromium and silicon that would form thin, stable, corrosion
resistant layers at sufficient concentrations of the two elements.
Although Fe-12Cr-2Si was not one of the alloy compositions tested, alloys with
both higher concentrations (Fe-18Cr-2.55Si) and lower concentrations (Fe-12Cr-1.25Si)
of chromium and silicon were tested, providing a reasonable basis upon which to infer
the corrosion behavior of the product form of concern in Project 06-038.
Drawing from both the qualitative and quantitative results of Lim's research,
Ballinger depicted his beliefs on the corrosion rate, Crate as a lognormal distribution
with a geometric mean of 0.0022 microns per hour, and a 90% confidence interval over
the geometric mean ± a factor of 2. This implied a lognormal distribution (shown in
Equation 5.1) with hyperparameters of p = 0.78855 and o = 0.30125.
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The relatively high uncertainty given to the prior belief on corrosion reflects a
number of factors: Lim's use of alloys with compositions different from that of Fe-
12Cr-2Si, the limited time span of the runs (the longest runs were 500h), and lack of
rigorous quantitative estimates of the corrosion rate.
5.5 Likelihood Functions and Updating
In order to determine the relationships between nodes within the Bayesian network,
likelihood functions were needed for two parameters: the diffusion coefficient, D0,
and the corrosion rate, Crate. Likelihood functions are statements of conditional
probability- they represent the likelihood of an underlying parameter (in this case
D, or Crate) being equal to a particular value, given an experimental observation.
5.5.1 Diffusion
Diffusion testing was completed in the second quarter of 2008. The diffusion coeffi-
cient, Do was estimated at 1.97. Ballinger characterized the error on this estimate to
be normally distributed, with uncertainty such that the estimate suggested with 90%
confidence that the true value of D0 lay between ± 50% of the estimate. This implies
a normally distributed likelihood function with hyperparameters y = 1.97 and o
0.50255.
Uncertainty on the evidence was considered to be greater than that of the prior
distribution drawn from the previous work of Borg and Lai. Although the Borg and
Lai tests studied diffusion of silicon in pure iron while the diffusion tests run by
Project 06-038 examined diffusion couples that had the alloy composition of the final
product form, the Borg and Lai tests also ran considerably more samples for longer
periods of time. As a consequence, the standard deviation, 0-, associated with the
diffusion testing was roughly twice that of the standard deviation given to the prior.
5.5.2 Corrosion
As of writing, corrosion testing has not been completed. Ballinger has characterized
the uncertainty on the experimental estimate of the corrosion rate to be lognormally
distributed: each individual sample tested is drawn from an underlying lognormal
distribution with unknown mean and known o equal to 0.13561. This value of o is
such that for each sample tested, there is a 90% probability that the true value of the
corrosion rate will be within ± a factor of 1.25 of the estimated value.
5.6 Assessment Methodology
The updating of the diffusion coefficient was performed analytically. The prior dis-
tribution, a normal distribution, was conjugate with the likelihood function that
updated it, another normal distribution with unknown mean and known precision.
The updating process for a normal conjugate prior was described in Section 3.2.4- in
short, the resulting posterior distribution is normally distributed with hyperparam-
eters determined by the mean and variance of the prior distribution and likelihood
function.
No updating was performed on the corrosion rate parameter. Instead, because the
corrosion experiments are unfinished as of writing, corrosion behavior was selected to
demonstrate the Bayesian method of evaluating the value of research.
Monte Carlo methodology was used to generate and evaluate random experimental
results as follows:
"True" values of Crate were randomly generated using the prior distribution on
Crate. Then, for each randomly obtained underlying value of Crate, a random sample
estimate on the corrosion rate, 2, was generated using the likelihood function. This
ii was used to update the prior distribution (the prior distribution, a lognormal, is
conjugate with the likelihood function, a lognormal with unknown mean and known
precision). Then, Monte Carlo was used once more to integrate the probability dis-
tribution function of TT: 10,000 random values of D0 , Q, and rate were generated
from their related distributions (the Crate values were generated from the posterior
distribution created by the z estimate) to determine an array of TT values, and these
TT values were compared with the protection layer thickness of the cladding prod-
uct form, 0.0762mm, to determine the probability of alloy viability. In this manner,
10,000 new states of knowledge were simulated and a probability of alloy viability
was estimated for each potential new state.
Twenty Monte Carlo runs in total were completed, ten using the prior distribution
on the diffusion coefficient and ten using the posterior distribution. For each run,
100,000,000 simulations were performed: 10,000 unique corrosion test results were
simulated and for each result simulated, 10,000 points were sampled from the resulting
distribution on TT to generate a probability of alloy validity. For each set of ten runs, a
different number of corrosion test samples were simulated, ranging from n=1 to n=10.
This range of n-values reflects a set of potential choices for experimental design that
are available in the upcoming corrosion testing and more generally represents a range
of potential tests with varying precision, from a relatively low precision experiment
simulated by n=1 and a relatively high-precision experiment simulated by n=10.
For each of the twenty runs, a value was assigned to each of the 10,000 simulated
new states of knowledge using the five knowledge valuation methods described in
Section 5.2. These values were then averaged to estimate the expected benefit of each
permutation of number of samples tested and diffusion state of knowledge.
The Monte Carlo code used to perform these tests is included in Appendix F.
5.7 Chapter Summary
In the interests of clarity, the scope of our case study was limited to two parameters:
corrosion and diffusion. These two parameters were used to define "alloy validity," a
boolean variable that is true only if the total thickness of the product's outer, pro-
tective layer is greater than the thickness of product lost to diffusion and corrosion
effects over the expected operational lifetime. The conditional probability relation-
ships between the tracked parameters and experimental results, as well as a set of
prior beliefs, were solicited from the principal researcher. Then, value was assigned
to different probabilities of alloy validity. This input was used to perform an updat-
ing on the diffusion parameter and estimate the expected value of the tests on the
corrosion parameter using both analytical and numerical uses of Bayes' Theorem.
Chapter 6
Results of the Case Study
There are two major updating results to report: the change in the distribution of D0,
and the change in the expected value of the corrosion testing following the updating
of the D, distribution.
6.1 Demonstration of Successful Updating - Diffu-
sion
The first important result to note is the change in the estimate of the diffusion coef-
ficient.
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the updating was fairly minor (the prior and posterior
distributions were not significantly different). The evidence from the diffusion testing
had a limited effect on the estimate of D, because the uncertainty associated with
the evidence was large relative to the uncertainty on the prior belief, and so the mean
of the posterior distribution remained close to that of the prior distribution.
The effect on the total probability of alloy viability was similarly small:
The total probability that the alloy meets the combined diffusion and corrosion
requirements declined by only 1.01%, from 73.57% to 72.56%. This result is not
particularly surprising- D, is not the most significant factor affecting TT, and the
change on D, was not dramatic.
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6.2 Demonstration of Successful Adaptation - Cor-
rosion
Even though the evidence gathered from diffusion testing did not lead to a dramatic
shift in expected success, it is still interesting to ask how the choice of experimental
design or the decision of whether to continue with the experiment at all might change
in response to this new evidence.
10,000 corrosion test results were simulated for each choice of n ranging from
n=1 to n=10. For each of these 10,000 corrosion test results, the probability of alloy
viability following an updating on the corrosion rate distribution was estimated using
10,000 random samples drawn from the posterior distribution of TT.
Due to the precision of the tests used to determine the long-run corrosion rate,
even experimental designs with only one sample were fairly conclusive in regards to
16000 1-
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the viability of the alloy. Prior to any hypothetical corrosion testing or diffusion
updating, the probability of alloy viability was equal to 73.57%, a state of knowledge
with zero value. As can be seen from the figure below, after testing a single corrosion
sample for 1000-hr, the viability of the alloy would most likely be known to a much
higher degree of certainty, with nearly 40% of the simulated cases having a probability
of alloy viability within one percent of one (certainty that the alloy is viable) or zero
(certainty that the alloy is inviable). Because the precision provided by each sample
in the experiment is so high (the true corrosion rate lies within ± a factor of 1.25 of
the sample value with 90% probability), we find that the consequences of corrosion
updating are quite strong.
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As n increases, the distribution of posterior validity probabilities concentrates even
further in the extremes. This reflects a tightening of the estimate on Crate around the
parameter's true value and a reduction of the uncertainty in the alloy's viability.
For each of the Monte Carlo runs, it is possible to calculate the benefit of each
of the 10,000 simulated states of knowledge and thus form an expectation on the
benefits of the research. Using an 80% standard (which reflects a valuation where the
cost of using an invalid alloy is 4x that of the benefit of using a valid alloy), the value
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of the initial state of knowledge (Pr(Valid) = 73.57%) is zero- if the probability
of alloy validity is less than 80% then it is advantageous not to use the alloy (an
action whose value we have normalized to zero). Meanwhile, the expected value of
the state of knowledge after a n=1 corrosion test is more than 50% of the benefit of a
known valid alloy, and a two-sample experiment has an expected benefit of more than
60%. For each of the five proposed knowledge state valuation methods, the expected
experiment benefits (prior to diffusion updating) are summarized in Table 6.1 as a
fraction of B, the benefit of having a valid alloy with absolute certainty:
Table 6.1: Expected Value of Experiment as
(Before Diffusion Updating)
a Function of N and Benefit Structure
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10
80.0% .5220 .6240 .6506 .6675 .6776 .6840 .6882 .6913 .6936 .6955
90.0% .4593 .5919 .6328 .6539 .6666 .6748 .6801 .6838 .6867 .6892
95.0% .4050 .5647 .6165 .6415 .6562 .6662 .6728 .6774 .6808 .6834
99.0% .3041 .5097 .5831 .6168 .6367 .6493 .6585 .6650 .6694 .6728
99.9% .2059 .4517 .5409 .5872 .6129 .6298 .6401 .6488 .6552 .6597
By taking the value difference between successive n's, these data can be used to
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derive the marginal benefit of n, shown in Table 6.2
Table 6.2: Marginal Value of N for each Benefit Structure (Before Diffusion Updating)
n=0 jn=1 In=2 |n=3 |n=4 In=5 |n=6 |n=7 |n=8 | n=9|
80.0% .5220 .1020 .0266 .0169 .0101 .0064 .0042 .0031 .0023 .0019
90.0% .4593 .1326 .0409 .0211 .0127 .0082 .0053 .0037 .0029 .0025
95.0% .4050 .1597 .0518 .0250 .0147 .0100 .0066 .0046 .0034 .0026
99.0% .3041 .2056 .0734 .0337 .0199 .0126 .0092 .0065 .0044 .0034
99.9% .2059 .2458 .0892 .0463 .0257 .0169 .0103 .0087 .0064 .0045
Using these data, one method of experimental design optimization would be to
determine the marginal cost of adding samples to the corrosion test runs and set
marginal benefit equal to marginal cost. In this manner, the total benefit of the
corrosion test would be maximized.
By comparing these results to those obtained using the new distribution on the
diffusion coefficient, it is possible to measure how the expected benefit of research
changes as a consequence of the new diffusion evidence. The expected and marginal
value tables for the updated diffusion probability distribution are provided below
along with histograms of the simulated viability probabilities for the n=1 and n=2
experimental designs following diffusion updating.
Table 6.3: Expected Value of Experiment as a
(After Diffusion Updating)
Function of N and Benefit Structure
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10
80.0% .5058 .6077 .6413 .6585 .6691 .6757 .6801 .6832 .6857 .6878
90.0% .4424 .5790 .6230 .6447 .6574 .6661 .6720 .6760 .6791 .6814
95.0% .3886 .5522 .6064 .6324 .6475 .6575 .6648 .6697 .6733 .6762
99.0% .2925 .4989 .5725 .6073 .6282 .6406 .6498 .6571 .6621 .6659
99.9% .1950 .4377 .5314 .5776 .6040 .6208 .6323 .6403 .6470 .6526
Because the updated distribution on the diffusion coefficient reduces the proba-
bility of alloy viability, we see three effects: a decrease in the expected benefit for all
of the experiment options under analysis, a decrease in the marginal benefit of the
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Table 6.4: Marginal Value of N for each Benefit Structure (After Diffusion Updating)
n=0 n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9
80.0% .5058 .1019 .0336 .0172 .0106 .0066 .0044 .0031 .0025 .0021
90.0% .4424 .1366 .0440 .0217 .0127 .0087 .0059 .0040 .0031 .0023
95.0% .3886 .1636 .0542 .0260 .0151 .0100 .0073 .0049 .0036 .0029
99.0% .2925 .2064 .0736 .0348 .0209 .0124 .0092 .0073 .0050 .0038
99.9% .1950 .2427 .0937 .0462 .0264 .0168 .0115 .0080 .0067 .0056
n=1 experimental design, and a slight increase in the marginal benefit of the higher
n designs.
The first two effects are intuitive: because the value of research outcomes are tied
to alloy validity and the probability of alloy validity has decreased, the benefit of
further testing is expected to decrease. The third result, that the marginal benefit of
higher n experimental designs would increase, is slightly non-intuitive. Although the
probability of alloy validity has decreased due to the expected diffusion characteristics
becoming less favorable, in the cases where the alloy is valid, a higher degree of
certainty is needed on the estimate of the corrosion rate in order to achieve the
confidence necessary to justify commercial use. In other words, the updating of
diffusion had an unambiguously negative effect on the marginal benefit of running an
experiment (the comparison between expected value at n=0 and n = some positive
value), but it had an ambiguous effect on the marginal benefit of precision- because
of the decrease in probability that the alloy is valid, higher precision tests are needed
to guarantee an alloy's validity and thus realize benefits.
One interpretation is as follows: if we do not assume anything about the nature
of the marginal cost of n but know that there must be an optimal n, we could say
that the probability of optimality has increased for n=0 (cessation of further tests),
decreased for all n>0, but decreased more strongly for n=1 such that relative to n=1,
the probability of optimality of n>1 tests have increased.
Professor Ballinger, before the diffusion updating, intended to run a five-sample
experiment. If his intention can be taken as revealed preference vis-a-vis the benefits
and costs of the experiment, we could very well conclude that in the face of discour-
aging evidence from the diffusion tests, the optimal number of samples for Ballinger
to test might actually increase slightly to n=6.
This finding should come with one caveat on generalization: it assumes that there
is not an option to run samples sequentially at equal cost to running them concur-
rently. If there is the option of running one sample, observing the results, and then
making a decision concerning whether to run another, without incurring a penalty
in terms of cost, then this sequential process would be guaranteed to be preferrable
to the alternatives, and thus the key finding from the diffusion updating would be
the decreased marginal value of the n=1 option. The difference in value between the
n=1 and n>1 experimental designs comes about because sometimes the n=1 results
on a valid alloy are encouraging, but not enough to offer sufficient precision to yield
a higher value state of knowledge, whereas a higher precision test would capture this
benefit. If tests could be run sequentially, the results from a first sample could be
used to better inform the decision to run a second sample, making n=1 the optimal
choice, and making the decreased marginal value of n=1 the more relevant indicator of
the experiment's change in favorability. Given the option of sequential test runs, the
optimality of lower precision tests would actually improve relative to higher precision
tests.
Lastly, it should be noted that the method used above to evaluate the benefit
of varying sample sizes in a corrosion experiment could more generally be applied
to a set of distinct experiments. In this manner, Bayesian updating could be used
to reallocate funding across a range of unique research projects in response to new
scientific information.
6.3 Chapter Summary
The diffusion updating was performed analytically and resulted in a slightly less favor-
able distribution on the tracked diffusion parameter. Because diffusion is a relatively
minor contributor to alloy validity, and because the change in the distribution on the
diffusion paramter was slight, the total probability of alloy validity fell only 1%, from
73.6 to 72.6 percent. From the estimation of the value of corrosion testing, we found
that due to the lower probability of alloy validity following the diffusion testing, the
value of corrosion testing fell for both low and high precision corrosion testing. Fur-
thermore, we found that the marginal value of precision actually increased slightly
for higher precision tests even as it fell for lower ones. Overall, the Bayesian method
worked quite well, and the case study showed a strong, generalizable way of using
Bayesian decision analysis.
Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusions
7.1 Case Study Results
The process of Bayesian updating proceeded smoothly, and the results from Monte
Carlo assessment of expected research value suggest that belief networks have the
potential to guide the allocation of research and development funds and improve
the efficiency of R&D. We were able to track the most important parameters of
the project, measure the change in expected benefit of the research project as new
evidence came in, and make statistically informed suggestions on experimental design.
The results were straight-forward and the methods used were generalizable to other
research projects. All of these results lead to the conclusion that it is possible to use
belief networks to develop measurements of research outcomes that would satisfy the
OMB's wish for efficiency metrics in federal agency spending.
7.2 Problems Facing Implementation
During the thesis work, a few minor hurdles were encountered that deserve mention.
7.2.1 Researcher Overconfidence
One problem that became apparent during the work was researcher overconfidence.
If the prior belief on the diffusion coefficient and the related likelihood function were
correct, the probability of observing what we did- an estimate on D, that was more
than twice the expected value provided by the prior distribution- would have been
vanishingly small. This suggests that the uncertainty on the diffusion coefficient could
have been underestimated when prior beliefs were solicited.
Since there is only one instance to suggest overconfidence, it cannot be objec-
tively claimed that overconfidence constitutes a proven trend among research project
managers- however there is also a priori reason to believe that overconfidence may
be a problem in the solicitation of priors. Psychology experiments have revealed that
in many professional areas, experts display an "overconfidence effect" when estimating
their uncertainty on a professional judgement[5].
The existence of overconfidence in solicited expert opinions is not necessarily a
disadvantage for the use of belief networks- after all, if research project decision
making suffers from the overconfidence effect when NOT using belief networks, it
could easily be possible that belief networks would not operate under a disadvantage
relative to their alternatives. Still, it is not encouraging to think that belief networks
will, as part of their regular operation, import the cognitive biases that they designed
to avoid.
There are a variety of options for expert solicitation, ranging from common prac-
tice to exotic, these may include peer review panels, Delphi methods, and prediction
markets. The correct option may vary from agency to agency and depend upon
the circumstances of the research (whether it involves classified or sensitive material,
whether there is an appropriate pool of in-house expertise, etc). If belief networks are
adopted as a means of measuring research efficiency and making funding allocation
decisions, special care should be made to ensure that overconfidence is reduced where
possible. There is future work to be done in developing methods of expert solicitation
that correct for common biases such as overconfidence.
7.2.2 Principal-Agent Relationships
One conclusion from the case study is that prior beliefs matter. The relative certainty
that was assigned to the prior belief on the diffusion coefficient had a significant impact
on how the evidence affected the state of beliefs, and affected the extent to which
the total probability of success was revised downward. In the case of extramural
research, if researcher input is solicited to form high stakes belief networks, there is
a risk of dishonest reporting and "gaming" of the system. As mentioned previously,
it is difficult to correct for this principal-agent game due to the low risk tolerances of
researchers relative to the financial stakes involved in R&D projects.
There are two potential solutions to this problem: the first is simply not to solicit
the input of agents (the researchers) in forming the belief network. If peer review and
other methods are sufficient, it may be easier to bypass the principal-agent problem
rather than set up an incentive structure to correct for it.
The other potential solution is to apply an incentive structure that utilizes not
just the results from a single project with a researcher, but instead makes use of
the entire lifetime of experience with a researcher. Two methods are explored below
through the use of a hypothetical example.
Let's use an example similar to that of Section 3.1.1. An agent, Angie, is applying
for grant funding from a principal, Paul. Angie has a coin that is biased either towards
head or tails such that the biased side comes up 75% of the time, but neither she nor
Paul knows which side it is biased towards. Paul values coins that are biased towards
heads and has no use for coins that are biased towards tails.
Both Paul and Angie study the coin and develop prior beliefs about the bias.
Paul, after consulting with a trusted internal review board, believes that with '6
probability the coin is biased towards heads, while Angie believes with 1 probability
the coin is biased towards heads (with complementary probabilities for bias towards
tails). Paul, deciding that Angie's input is relevant and equally likely to be correct
as his internal review board's, is willing to form the prior of the belief network by
simply averaging the probability of heads bias that Paul believes with the probability
given by Angie. Angie must now decide whether to submit her honest expectation
(there is a 1 probability the coin is biased towards heads), or one of three variations:
an optimistic expectation (j probability of heads), an exaggerated expectation ( 5
probability of heads) or outright lie (Angie proclaims with 100% certainty that the
coin is heads-biased).
Whatever the expectation that the Angie submits, let's assume that Paul agrees
to fund a study of the coin. The study consists of one coin flip, and it comes up tails.
Paul must now decide whether to continue funding the study of this coin.
We can adopt a variety of interesting assumptions on benefits or cost: constant
cost per coin flip, cost gets cut in half for each successive coin flip (i.e, for your
first dollar you get one flip, for your second dollar you can determine with absolute
certainty the bias of the coin), but the more relevant consideration this: on what
grounds should Paul base his decision to continue or not continue the funding, and
how should his experience change his future interactions with Angie?
First, let's look at the different priors and posteriors that form from the different
beliefs that Angie can report.
Figure 7-1: Prior and Posterior Beliefs on the Probability of Heads Bias
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In Figure 7-1 we see an expected result: as Angie's reported beliefs become more
favorable towards a heads bias, both the prior and posterior values on the probability
of the coin having a heads bias rise. As a consequence, Paul is more likely not only
to begin funding Angie, but also to continue funding after negative results have been
received. This is the heart of the principal-agent problem: Angie lacks an incentive
to report accurate prior beliefs.
Paul lacks the ability to penalize Angie for misreporting her prior beliefs. There
is no way to recover the grant money he has already given and no reasonable way to
contract beforehand for making grant money contingent on favorable results. What
Paul can do is deny future grant funding and discount future beliefs reported by
Angie.
In Figure 7-2, the relative likelihood of Angie and Paul's reported beliefs is shown.
What the figure depicts is the probability, given that Angie's reported beliefs are
true, of witnessing the experimental results (a tails flip outcome), relative to the
probability of witnessing a tails outcome given that Paul's beliefs are true. It is the
ratio of the likelihood that Paul assigned to a tails outcome to the likelihood that
Angie assigned to a tails outcome, normalized by the probability that either Paul or
Angie's beliefs were true. In other words, the weightings shown in Figure 7-2 reflect a
miniature Bayesian updating: Paul began by assigning equal probability to both his
and Angie's reported beliefs. Having seen the outcome of the experiment, were Paul
to re-solicit Angie's beliefs, he would not assign her beliefs a probability equal to his
own, but instead would discount them as shown.
The obvious result is that the greater the extent to which Angie misreported her
beliefs, the greater the extent to which her beliefs are discounted in future rounds.
Paul can use this Bayesian updating to penalize Angie in two ways: a punitive
system and non-punitive system.
In a punitive system, Paul would penalize Angie by denying future grant funding.
The greater the extent to which Angie's beliefs deviate from the evidence, the greater
the extent to which funding would be denied in future rounds.
In a non-punitive system, Paul would not deny Angie future funding, but would
discount her beliefs in future rounds by tracking the accuracy of Angie's reported
Figure 7-2: Relative Likelihood of Angie and Paul's Reported Beliefs
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beliefs relative to those of his own and applying the appropriate weighting to future
priors.
The disadvantage of the punitive system is that while it can be geared to make
honest submission of priors the optimal choice for Angie, the penalty that is applied
on Angie harms Paul as well. If Angie suggests a research project that Paul's internal
review board concludes has a high benefit to cost ratio, Paul may be bound to not
grant Angie money in order to apply a penalty to past performance.
The disadvantage of the non-punitive system is that it is impossible to reward
honesty- the system merely curbs the effects of dishonesty (and inaccuracy in gen-
eral). As a consequence, if a researcher does not care if they have no control over how
the priors of their future research projects will formed, there is nothing to discourage
them from reporting dishonest prior beliefs.
In both systems, the fundamental idea is to construct some sort of agent "repu-
tation" that tracks past performance and modifies future grant allocation. The basic
principle involved is that while it is difficult to properly solve the principal-agent
problem within one research project, it may be possible to solve it over a broader
time horizon where, by spreading the penalty assigned to inaccurate priors, agent
risk aversion will be diminished as a factor.
7.2.3 Computational Limitations
Even for relatively limited experimental options, the computational requirements for
analysis expand quickly. In this experiment we analyzed how one simple choice of
experimental design, the number of samples to be tested in the corrosion experiment,
was updated by results from other experiments. Had we looked at several different
choices of experiments, each with their own experimental design choices, and analyzed
the full range of sequential choices available (such as the choice to run Experiment 1
before running Experiment 2 and so on), the computational requirements would have
been much greater. With only ten distinct experiments and the choice to run them in
any given order, there would be nearly nine million different possible permutations,
requiring several computer-centuries to analyze.
Belief networks are most effective when they are broad and encompassing- incom-
plete networks run the risk of overlooking important contributions to research value or
missing connections between critical parameters. However, as belief networks grow,
the computational needs to support them grow as well.
If belief networks are adopted on a large scale, it will be important to develop
reliable heuristics in order to reduce their computational requirements.
To illustrate, suppose a simple example involving an alloy, Unobtainium, whose
utility depends on three parameters of the alloy: X, Y, and Z. The three parameters
can take values of either 0 or 1, and the alloy only has utility if all three parameters
are equal to 1. Prior beliefs are solicited- the probability that X=1 is 10%, Y=1 is
50%, and Z=1 is 90%. The expected value of using the alloy is only positive if the
probability of X=Y=Z=1 is greater than 90%. For each parameter, a researcher has a
single experiment that he can perform that will determine the value of the parameter
with absolute certainty.
We would like to know whether the researcher should perform an experiment (if
the expected benefits of the experiment are greater than the expected costs) and of
the experiments he can run, which one he should prefer to run first (the experiment
with the highest ratio of expected benefits to expected costs).
If we construct a valuation function that looks at the value of only one action set,
Use Alloy vs. Don't Use Alloy, we would find that the expected value of any single
experiment is zero- none of the three experiments are sufficient, by themselves, to
establish the degree of certainty necessary to give the Use Alloy action a positive
expected value.
Instead, it is necessary to construct a valuation function that looks at not only the
change in expected value of the Use/Dont Use Alloy action set, but also the Test/Dont
Test action sets on X, Y, and Z. For example, the expected value of testing X would be
equal to the highest valued action of the set of actions Test Y/Test Z/End Testing.
In turn, the expected value of the actions Test Y and Test Z would be equal to
the highest valued action of the set of actions Test Z/End Testing and Test Y/End
Testing, respectively.
In other words, in order to determine the value of the research options, it would
be necessary to evaluate the expected value of every single permutation of testing
options.
In this example, it is apparent that if the cost of testing is identical for each
parameter, then the researcher should test X, then Y, then Z. For a test cost, C, the
expected cost of this testing order is 1.15C (in 90% of scenarios, the test for X will
come back positive and only 1 C will be paid, in 5% of scenarios the test for X will
come back positive but the test for Y will come back negative, and so only 2 C will
be paid, and in the remaining 5% of scenarios, both X and Y will test positive and 3
C will be paid) and it is expected that Unobtanium will be proven useful in 4.5% of
scenarios.
In more complicated examples, where evaluating the full set of possible permu-
tations of actions would be unrealistic, it will be necessary to limit the range of
permutations that are considered. A similar problem is faced in other machine-aided
decision-making applications: for example, in computer chess playing software, where
there may be thirty or more possible moves per position and a program might easily
be expected to analyze forty to sixty moves deep, even a powerful computer with
the capability to analyze one million positions per second would spend more than a
year looking less than ten moves deep. Instead, to achieve greater depth of analysis,
computer programs regularly prune options from the decision tree they are analyzing.
At the level of an individual research project, (such as the case study this thesis
analyzed), little pruning is necessary to satisfactorily answer questions of interest. If
the scope were expanded, say, from studying a single alloy to studying a range of
alloys, or a range of lead reactor designs, or a range of energy technologies, consider-
ably more thought would need to be given to the selection of outcomes to simulate
and decisions to analyze.
7.3 Conclusions
Overall, the proof of concept demonstration was encouraging. A belief network was
used to estimate and update the probability of experimental success in a way that
enables valuation of research outcomes. In the process, the network was used to
assign expectations of benefit to different experiments. Some work remains in formal-
izing how Bayesian decision making can be integrated into existing regulations and
practices, and more effort is needed to address the computational challenge posed by
large scale belief networks, however the success in applying belief networks to this
case study demonstrates a potential for belief networks as not just a passive metric
of research efficiency, but also as an active tool to be used in funding allocation and
experiment design. Their use in research and development oversight seems warranted.
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Appendix A
Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) Questions
The PART Questionaire consists of 25 questions divided into four sections. Three
additional questions are asked of research and development projects. The full text of
each question, including the R&D specific questions, is provided below.
A.1 Section I, Program Purpose and Design
1.1: Is the program purpose clear?
1.2: Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?
1.3: Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any
other Federal, State, local or private effort?
1.4: Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the programs
effectiveness or efficiency?
1.5: Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the
programs purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?
A.2 Section II, Strategic Planning
2.1: Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance
measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
2.2: Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term
measures?
2.3: Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance
measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the programs long-term
goals?
2.4: Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual mea-
sures?
2.5: Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing
partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual
and/or long-term goals of the program?
2.6: Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a
regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness
and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
2.7: Are budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and
long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and
transparent manner in the programs budget?
2.8: Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning
deficiencies?
2.RD1: If applicable, does the program assess and compare the potential benefits
of efforts within the program and (if relevant) to other efforts in other programs that
have similar goals?
2.RD2: Does the program use a prioritization process to guide budget requests
and funding decisions?
A.3 Section III, Program Management
3.1: Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information,
including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program
and improve performance?
3.2: Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees,
contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable
for cost, schedule and performance results?
3.3: Are funds (Federal and partners) obligated in a timely manner, spent for the
intended purpose, and accurately reported?
3.4: Does the program have procedures (e.g., competitive sourcing/cost compar-
isons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies
and cost effectiveness in program execution?
3.5: Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related pro-
grams?
3.6: Does the program use strong financial management practices?
3.7: Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficien-
cies?
3.RD1: For R&D programs other than competitive grants programs, does the pro-
gram allocate funds and use management processes that maintain program quality?
A.4 Section IV, Program Results/Accountability
4.1: Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term
performance goals?
4.2: Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual perfor-
mance goals?
4.3: Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in
achieving program goals each year?
4.4: Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs,
including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
4.5: Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the
program is effective and achieving results?
Appendix B
Derivation of Bayes' Theorem from
the Definition of Conditional
Probability
Bayes Theorem can be developed from the definition of conditional probability:
and
P(AIB) =
P(B|A) =
F(AnB)
P(B)
P(A n B)
P(A)
Combining these two equations yields
P(A|B) P(B) = P(A n B) = P(BIA) P(A)
Dividing each side by Pr(B) then yields Bayes' Theorem
P(A|B) = P(A n B) _
P(B)
P(BIA) P(A)
P(B)
(B.1)
(B.2)
(B.3)
(B.4)
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Appendix C
Research and Development
Program Investment Criteria
1 In 2007, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum to federal
agencies concerning compliance with PART requirements. Included in the memoran-
dum was guidance to federal agencies on the factors to be considered when assessing
the investment quality of research and development projects. The text from the
memorandum devoted to R&D is given below.
As another initiative of the Presidents Management Agenda, the development
of explicit R&D investment criteria builds on the best of the planning and assess-
ment practices that R&D program managers use to plan and assess their programs.
The Administration has worked with experts and stakeholders to build upon lessons
learned from previous approaches.
Agencies should use the criteria as broad guidelines that apply at all levels of
Federally funded R&D efforts, and they should use the PART as the instrument to
periodically evaluate compliance with the criteria at the program level. To make
this possible, the R&D PART aligns with the R&D criteria. The R&D criteria are
reprinted here as a guiding framework for addressing the R&D PART.
The R&D criteria address not only planning, management, and prospective assess-
'The Research and Development Program Investment Criteria is drawn from the website of the
USDA [22]
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ment but also retrospective assessment. Retrospective review of whether investments
were well-directed, efficient, and productive is essential for validating program design
and instilling confidence that future investments will be wisely invested. Retrospec-
tive reviews should address continuing program relevance, quality, and successful
performance to date.
While the criteria are intended to apply to all types of R&D, the Administration
is aware that predicting and assessing the outcomes of basic research in particular is
never easy. Serendipitous results are often the most interesting and ultimately may
have the most value. Taking risks and working toward difficult-to-attain goals are
important aspects of good research management, and innovation and breakthroughs
are among the results. However, there is no inherent conflict between these facts and
a call for clearer information about program goals and performance toward achiev-
ing those goals. The Administration expects agencies to focus on improving the
management of their research programs and adopting effective practices, and not on
predicting the unpredictable.
The R&D investment criteria have several potential benefits:
" Use of the criteria allows policy makers to make decisions about programs based
on information beyond anecdotes, prior-year funding levels, and lobbying of
special interests.
" A dedicated effort to improve the process for budgeting, selecting, and managing
R&D programs is helping to increase the return on taxpayer investment and the
productivity of the Federal R&D portfolio.
" The R&D investment criteria will help communicate the Administrations ex-
pectations for proper program management.
* The criteria and subsequent implementation guidance will also set standards
for information to be provided in program plans and budget justifications.
" The processes and collected information promoted under the criteria will im-
prove public understanding of the possible benefits and effectiveness of the Fed-
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eral investment in R&D.
Details on the Criteria
The Relevance, Quality, and Performance criteria apply to all R&D programs.
Industry- or market-relevant applied R&D must meet additional criteria. Together,
these criteria can be used to assess the need, relevance, appropriateness, quality, and
performance of Federal R&D programs.
I. Relevance
R&D investments must have clear plans, must be relevant to national priorities,
agency missions, relevant fields, and "customer" needs, and must justify their claim
on taxpayer resources. Programs that directly support Presidential priorities may re-
ceive special consideration with adequate documentation of their relevance. Review
committees should assess program objectives and goals on their relevance to national
needs, customer needs, agency missions, and the field(s) of study the program strives
to address. For example, the Joint DOE/NSF Nuclear Sciences Advisory Committees
Long Range Plan and the Astronomy Decadal Surveys are the products of good plan-
ning processes because they articulate goals and priorities for research opportunities
within and across their respective fields.
OMB will work with some programs to identify quantitative metrics to estimate
and compare potential benefits across programs with similar goals. Such comparisons
may be within an agency or among agencies.
A. Programs must have complete plans, with clear goals and priorities.
Programs must provide complete plans, which include explicit statements of:
" specific issues motivating the program;
" broad goals and more specific tasks meant to address the issues;
" priorities among goals and activities within the program;
" human and capital resources anticipated; and
" intended program outcomes, against which success may later be assessed.
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B. Programs must articulate the potential public benefits of the pro-
gram.
Programs must identify potential benefits, including added benefits beyond those
of any similar efforts that have been or are being funded by the government or others.
R&D benefits may include technologies and methods that could provide new options
in the future, if the landscape of todays needs and capabilities changes dramatically.
Some programs and sub-program units may be required to quantitatively estimate
expected benefits, which would include metrics to permit meaningful comparisons
among programs that promise similar benefits. While all programs should try to
articulate potential benefits, OMB and OSTP recognize the difficulty in predicting
the outcomes of basic research. Consequently, agencies may be allowed to relax this
as a requirement for basic research programs.
C. Programs must document their relevance to specific Presidential
priorities to receive special consideration.
Many areas of research warrant some level of Federal funding. Nonetheless, the
President has identified a few specific areas of research that are particularly important.
To the extent a proposed project can document how it directly addresses one of these
areas, it may be given preferential treatment.
D. Program relevance to the needs of the Nation, of fields of Science
& Technology, and of program "customers" must be assessed through
prospective external review.
Programs must be assessed on their relevance to agency missions, fields of science
or technology, or other customer needs. A customer may be another program at the
same or another agency, an interagency initiative or partnership, or a firm or other
organization from another sector or country. As appropriate, programs must define
a plan for regular reviews by primary customers of the programs relevance to their
needs. These programs must provide a plan for addressing the conclusions of external
reviews.
E. Program relevance to the needs of the Nation, of fields of S&T, and of
program "customers" must be assessed periodically through retrospective
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external review.
Programs must periodically assess the need for the program and its relevance
to customers against the original justifications. Programs must provide a plan for
addressing the conclusions of external reviews.
II. Quality
Programs should maximize the quality of the R&D they fund through the use of a
clearly stated, defensible method for awarding a significant majority of their funding.
A customary method for promoting R&D quality is the use of a competitive, merit-
based process. NSFs process for the peer-reviewed, competitive award of its R&D
grants is a good example. Justifications for processes other than competitive merit
review may include "outside-the-box" thinking, a need for timeliness (e.g., R&D
grants for rapid response studies of Pfisteria), unique skills or facilities, or a proven
record of outstanding performance (e.g., performance-based renewals).
Programs must assess and report on the quality of current and past R&D. For
example, NSFs use of Committees of Visitors, which review NSF directorates, is an
example of a good quality assessment tool. OMB and OSTP encourage agencies to
provide the means by which their programs may be benchmarked internationally or
across agencies, which provides one indicator of program quality.
A. Programs allocating funds through means other than a competitive,
merit-based process must justify funding methods and document how qual-
ity is maintained.
Programs must clearly describe how much of the requested funding will be broadly
competitive based on merit, providing compelling justifications for R&D funding al-
located through other means. (See OMB Circular A-11 for definitions of competitive
merit review and other means of allocating Federal research funding.) All program
funds allocated through means other than unlimited competition must document the
processes they will use to distribute funds to each type of R&D performer (e.g., Fed-
eral laboratories, Federally-funded R&D centers, universities, etc.). Programs are
encouraged to use external assessment of the methods they use to allocate R&D and
maintain program quality.
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B. Program quality must be assessed periodically through retrospective
expert review.
Programs must institute a plan for regular, external reviews of the quality of the
program's research and research performers, including a plan to use the results from
these reviews to guide future program decisions. Rolling reviews performed every 3-5
years by advisory committees can satisfy this requirement. Benchmarking of scientific
leadership and other factors provides an effective means of assessing program quality
relative to other programs, other agencies, and other countries.
III. Performance
R&D programs should maintain a set of high priority, multi-year R&D objectives
with annual performance outputs and milestones that show how one or more outcomes
will be reached. Metrics should be defined not only to encourage individual program
performance but also to promote, as appropriate, broader goals, such as innovation,
cooperation, education, and dissemination of knowledge, applications, or tools.
OMB encourages agencies to make the processes they use to satisfy the Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act (GRPA) consistent with the goals and metrics
they use to satisfy these R&D criteria. Satisfying the R&D performance criteria for
a given program should serve to set and evaluate R&D performance goals for the
purposes of GPRA. OMB expects goals and performance measures that satisfy the
R&D criteria to be reflected in agency performance plans. Programs must demon-
strate an ability to manage in a manner that produces identifiable results. At the
same time, taking risks and working toward difficult-to-attain goals are important
aspects of good research management, especially for basic research. The intent of
the investment criteria is not to drive basic research programs to pursue less risky
research that has a greater chance of success. Instead, the Administration will focus
on improving the management of basic research programs.
OMB will work with some programs to identify quantitative metrics to compare
performance across programs with similar goals. Such comparisons may be within an
agency or among agencies.
Construction projects and facility operations will require additional performance
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metrics. Cost and schedule earned-value metrics for the construction of R&D facil-
ities must be tracked and reported. Within DOE, the Office of Sciences formalized
independent reviews of technical cost, scope, and schedule baselines and project man-
agement of construction projects ("Lehman Reviews") are widely recognized as an
effective practice for discovering and correcting problems involved with complex, one-
of-a-kind construction projects.
A. Programs may be required to track and report relevant program
inputs annually.
Programs may be expected to report relevant program inputs, which could include
statistics on overhead, intramural/extramural spending, infrastructure, and human
capital. These inputs should be discussed with OMB.
B. Programs must define appropriate output and outcome measures,
schedules, and decision points.
Programs must provide single- and multi-year R&D objectives, with annual per-
formance outputs, to track how the program will improve scientific understanding
and its application. Programs must provide schedules with annual milestones for
future competitions, decisions, and termination points, highlighting changes from
previous schedules. Program proposals must define what would be a minimally effec-
tive program and a successful program. Agencies should define appropriate output
and outcome measures for all R&D programs, but agencies should not expect funda-
mental basic research to be able to identify outcomes and measure performance in the
same way that applied research or development are able to. Highlighting the results
of basic research is important, but it should not come at the expense of risk-taking
and innovation. For some basic research programs, OMB may accept the use of qual-
itative outcome measures and quantitative process metrics. Facilities programs must
define metrics and methods (e.g., earned-value reporting) to track development costs
and to assess the use and needs of operational facilities over time. If leadership in
a particular field is a goal for a program or agency, OMB and OSTP encourage the
use of benchmarks to assess the processes and outcomes of the program with respect
to leadership. OMB encourages agencies to make the processes they use to satisfy
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GPRA consistent with the goals and metrics they use to satisfy these R&D criteria.
C. Program performance must be retrospectively documented annually.
Programs must document performance against previously defined output and out-
come metrics, including progress toward objectives, decisions, and termination points
or other transitions. Programs with similar goals may be compared on the basis
of their performance. OMB will work with agencies to identify such programs and
appropriate metrics to enable such comparisons.
IV. Criteria for R&D Programs Developing Technologies That Address Industry
The purpose of some R&D and technology demonstration programs and projects
is to introduce some product or concept into the marketplace. However, some of these
efforts engage in activities that industry is capable of doing and may discourage or
even displace industry investment that would occur otherwise. For the purposes of
assessing Federal R&D investments, the following criteria should be used to assess
industry-relevant R&D and demonstration projects, including, at OMB discretion,
associated construction activities.
OMB will work with programs to identify quantitative metrics to measure and
compare potential benefits and performance across programs with similar goals, as
well as ways to assess market relevance.
A. Programs and projects must articulate public benefits of the pro-
gram using uniform benefit indicators across programs and projects with
similar goals.
In addition to the public benefits required in the general criteria, all industry-
relevant programs and projects must identify and use uniform benefit indicators (in-
cluding benefit-cost ratios) to enable comparisons of expected benefits across pro-
grams and projects. OMB will work with agencies to identify these indicators.
B. Programs and projects must justify the appropriateness of Federal
investment, including the manner in which the market fails to motivate
private sector investment.
A lack of market incentives discourages private firms from investing in research
where the benefits may occur far in the future, the risks may be too great for non-
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Federal participants, or the benefits accrue to the public rather than private investors.
Programs and projects must demonstrate that industry investment is sub-optimal and
explain in what way the market fails that prevents the private sector from capturing
the benefits of developing the good or service.
C. Programs and projects must demonstrate that investment in R&D
and demonstration activities is the best means to support the Federal
policy goals, compared to other policy alternatives.
When the Federal government chooses to intervene to address market failures,
there may be many policy alternatives to address those failures. Among the other
tools available to the government are legislation, tax policy, regulatory and enforce-
ment efforts, and an integrated combination of these approaches. In this context,
projects to address issues of genuine Federal concern should be able to illustrate how
R&D and demonstration activities are superior to other policy tools in addressing
Federal goals, either by themselves or as part of an integrated package.
D. Programs and projects must document industry or market relevance,
including readiness of the market to adopt technologies or other outputs.
Programs must assess the likelihood that the target industry will be able to adopt
the technology or other program outputs. The level of industry cost sharing is one
indicator of industry relevance. Before projects move into demonstration or deploy-
ment stages, an economic analysis of the public and private returns on the public
investment must be provided.
E. Program performance plans and reports must include off ramps and
transition points.
In addition to the schedules and decision points defined in the general criteria,
program plans should also identify whether, when, and how aspects of the program
may be shifted to the private sector.
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Appendix D
Estimated Probability of
Discovering the Higgs Boson
The following figure is drawn from a presentation given by Dmitri Denisov, a lead
researcher at the Fermi National Laboratory:
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Figure D-1: Estimated Probability of Discovering the Higgs Boson, Given Boson Mass
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Appendix E
Description of the Static Corrosion
Test Facility at MIT
The following is drawn from the quarterly reports provided to the Nuclear Energy
Research Initiative by the principal researcher of Project 06-038, Professor Ronald
Ballinger.
The static corrosion test system consists of three subsystems that can be described
as follows:
Corrosion cell system (2): Each cell consists of a high temperature furnace equipped
with a controller and a rotating feed-through that allows for the rotation of the sam-
ple if required. Each cell can be operated in the non-rotating ("static") mode simple
immersion tests. However, the test cells are not designed to simulate a loop type
system. The maximum temperature for test is 1000 C and the maximum rotational
velocity is to 2 m/s for a 100mm diameter disk sample. A vacuum-tight outer bound-
ary is achieved by a stainless steel vessel whose joints are welded and leak-tested
using helium gas leak detector at a maximum rate of 10-7 cc/sec. A ceramic, 4 liter,
crucible, ZrO2 , is used as the container for the molten alloy. Thin, disc type speci-
mens can be attached to a Molybdenum rod to be immersed in the melt. To prevent
a galvanic couple between the shaft rod and specimen material, ceramic washers are
inserted between those joints. Immersion tests can also be accomplished via the use
of individual crucibles for each sample set.
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Oxygen probe: Oxygen potential measurement is achieved using a solid electrolyte
and reference electrode. A Bi/Bi20 3 reference electrode is used to measure the
oxygen concentration in the molten lead. The EMF signal of probe is converted into
oxygen concentration using the Nernst equation. The current oxygen probe is the
product of a long collaborative development effort between MIT and LANL.
Oxygen control/monitoring system: Oxygen control is achieved by means of the
thermodynamic equilibrium of H 20-H 2-0 2. With this technique a very low oxygen
partial pressure can be obtained. With the MIT system the main variable is the
pressure ratio of H2 /H 2 0 controlled by hydrogen gas flow and moisture intake by
bubbling. Pre-purified Argon is used as a carrier gas and mixed with hydrogen (also
pre-purified) below the flammable point by mass flow controller. An oxygen gettering
furnace is used to eliminate impurity oxygen still remaining at ppm levels in the
argon. Hydrogen also passes through a purifier and drier before being mixed with
argon. Gas flow passing through the constant water bath contains moisture up to
several thousand ppm to the corrosion cell system. Several measurement units for
moisture and gas phase oxygen are installed in order to track the changes in the
mixture concentration.
In addition to the rigorous oxygen control system, each test contains several sam-
ples of pure metals (Fe or Cr) that are exposed } in the gas phase above the molten2
metal and j in the molten metal. After each test these samples are examined for2
the presence of an oxide layer which would indicate the presence of oxygen above a
certain threshold. The absence of an oxide layer, conversely, is an indicator that the
oxygen potential is below a certain potential.
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Appendix F
Monte Carlo Source Code
The Monte Carlo code was executed using the the MATLAB numerical computing
environment. The value of n and hyperparameters used to generate D, were changed
between runs as necessary.
m = 0.788546;
sigmaone = .30125;
sigmatwo = .13561;
lengthone = 10000;
lengthtwo = 10000;
counter=0;
n = 1;
record = zeros(lengthone, 1);
TotalT = 0;
musample = 0;
CRate= 0;
Q = 0;
for i=1:lengthone
musample = lognrnd(m, sigmaone);
xbarsample = log(lognrnd(log(musample), sigmatwo/sqrt(n)));
mprime = ((m /(sigmaone^2) + n^2 * xbarsample / (sigmatwoc2))/(1/sigmaone^2
+ n^2 / sigmatwo^2));
sigmaprime = (1/(sigmaone^2) + n^2 / (sigmatwo^2))^(-.5);
for j= 1: lengthtwo
D-o = normrnd(.91728, .234);
Q = normrnd(52.45, .12755);
DSi = D-o * exp(-1000*Gibbs/(1.9858775*923.15));
if DSiO
DSi=0;
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CRate = lognrnd(mprime, sigmaprime);
TotalT = CRate * .02628 + 10786.0827 * sqrt(DSi);
if TotalT .0762
counter = counter+1;
end
end
record(i) = counter / lengthtwo;
counter = 0;
end
save dataOlprior record
dataarray = zeros(20,5);
load dataolprior.mat
valueeighty = 0;
valueninety = 0;
valueninetyfive 0;
valueninetynine 0;
valuenineninenine = 0;
for i=1:10000
if record(i) 0.999
valuenineninenine = (valuenineninenine + .1 *(record(i)-0.999));
end
end
for i=1:10000
if record(i) 0.99
valueninetynine = (valueninetynine + .01*(record(i)-0.99));
end
end
for i=1:10000
if record(i) 0.95
valueninetyfive = (valueninetyfive + .002* (record(i)-0.95));
end
end
for i=1:10000
if record(i) 0.9
valueninety = (valueninety + .001*(record(i)-0.9));
end
end
for i=1:10000
if record(i) 0.8
valueeighty = (valueeighty + .0005* (record(i)-0.8));
end
end
dataarray(1,1) =valueeighty;
dataarray(1,2)=valueninety;
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dataarray( 1,3)=valueninetyfive;
dataarray( 1,4)zzvalueninetynine;,
dataarray( 1,5)=valuenineninenine-;
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